On the probability of entry in potential competition cases

This paper explores, both theoretically and empirically, the extent to which having ‘other potential entrants’ to a market injected into potential-competition cases has been a worthwhile enterprise. This two-pronged attack leads to the conclusion that (he attempt to specifically identify potential entrants probably results in our deluding ourselves as to the likelihood that entry will occur, and that unless a convincing argument can be made to the effect that any given potential entrant from a stockpile of unnamed potential entrants is ‘reasonably likely’ to elect the entry option, expanding lhat stockpile will be similarly misleading.     

Economic stability under fixed and flexible exchange rates

This paper analytically compares macroeconomic performance under fixed and flexible exchange-rate regimes. A model is developed in which the economy is stable around full employment, but subject to periodic random shocks. From the model, conditions are derived which allow comparison (across exchange-rate regimes) of the size of the expected squared deviation from full employment income in any arbitrarily selected period. These conditions are stated in terms of the variances and elasticities of particular behavioral relations.     

THE ACTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATION

In recent years, boards of directors have become more active and independent of management in pursuing shareholder interests. But, up to this point, there has been little empirical evidence that active boards help companies produce higher rates of return for their shareholders. In this article, after describing the new board activism, the authors argue that past failures to document an association between independent boards and superior corporate performance can be explained by two features of the research: its concentration on periods prior to the 1990s (when most boards were largely irrelevant) and its use of unreliable proxies (such as a minimum percentage of outside directors) for a well-functioning board.
The authors hypothesize that an independent and resourceful board takes steps that require management to increase earnings available to investors. To test this hypothesis, the performance of a sample of large U.S. corporations was examined over the period 1991-1995 using two proxies for the "professionalism" of each company's board: (1) the letter grades (A+ to F) assigned by CalPERS for corporate governance; and (2) a "presence" or "absence" grade based on three key indicators of professional board behavior. Both of these governance metrics were associated in statistically significant ways with superior corporate performance, as measured by earnings in excess of cost of capital and net of the industry average. While acknowledging that such results do not prove causation, the authors conclude that, in the first half of the 1990s, corporations with active and independent boards added significantly more value for shareholders than those with passive, "rubber-stamp" boards.     

FDIC Coverage on bank failures: Cointegration analysis using annual data, 1942–91

The present study empirically investigates whether in the U.S. federal government-provided deposit insurance, which was intended to prevent runs on banks and to protect depositors of modest means, has acted to induce increased bank failures. This issue has been investigated earlier, but only with regression analysis, and it remains unresolved since results vary sharply from one study to the next. By contrast, the present study uses cointegration techniques to investigate this problem. The cointegration analysis finds strong evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the bank failure rate and the extent of central government-provided deposit insurance, as well as other variables. Maximum eigenvalue and trace test results, along with normalized cointegrating vectors and likelihood ratio test results, are provided for examination.     

Quasi-cournot behavior in a multimarket,multiplant setting

This paper introduces multimarket selling options, capacity constraints and quasi-Cournot conjectures into oligopolistic rivalry. It is shown that increased output responses between rivals that are producing below capacity will effect output reductions for all markets, but that increased output responses between rivals that are producing at capacity will effect an output increase in at least one market and might even result in a capacity extension and output increases in all markets.     

If you play well they will come—and vice versa: bidirectional causality in major‐league baseball

The Granger‐causality test is applied to the annual attendance and win‐percentage data for 29 major‐league teams. It is shown that bidirectional causality exists for these teams and that there are some essential differences between the original 10 of 16 franchises that comprised the majors in 1903 and the six that relocated between 1953 and 1961. Some differences and some similarities are also seen in the parameter estimates for both blocs of teams, the relocated teams, and seven long‐lived expansion franchises. Finally, the parameter estimates are manipulated to yield noise‐free equilibrium estimates for both attendance and performance. In tandem, these two sets of estimates provide fodder for speculation as to the futures of each of the extant 23 franchises considered here. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Preliminary Investigation into the Effects of the Federal Override of State Usury Ceilings on the Supply of Mortgage Funds by FSLIC-Insured S&Ls in New York and New Jersey

Examined is the economic theory that restrictive usury ceilings reduce the supply of residential mortgage funds and tighten terms of the mortgage instrument. Studied are the mortgage policies adopted by New York and New Jersey FSLIC-insured S&Ls during periods when there were restrictive usury ceilings and when these usury ceilings were removed. The results clearly confirm the theory that effective elimination of usury ceilings increases the supply of mortgage funds and also liberalizes the terms of the mortgage instrument.