The empirical link between export dispersion and export performance: A contingency-based approach

Practitioners and scholars point out that firms are increasingly dispersing their capabilities across organizational functions. However, it is not clear whether all forms of dispersion, of any function, result in the same consequences. This study initiates investigation into the link between the cross-functional dispersion of influence on export marketing decisions (export dispersion) and export performance. Drawing on data from a sample of 225 UK exporters, the findings support the argument that active participation of non-export functions in export-marketing decisions affects export success. However, those performance consequences are dependent on internal and external contingencies. Export dispersion is beneficial for export performance when the export customer environment is more turbulent and, simultaneously, the export technological environment is more stable and the firm has lower levels of export information sharing. In all other scenarios examined in this study, greater levels of concentration of export decision-making (i.e. lower levels of export dispersion) appear to be more beneficial for export performance. Our findings imply that the management of the firm’s level of export dispersion is a complex task, whereby the degree of export dispersion pursued needs to match external environmental and internal firm factors.     

Learning by a dominant firm

This paper is concerned with the optimal output decisions of a dominant firm in the presence of imperfect information about the rival's reactions. The model is multi-period with the profits in each period being independent of those in other periods. Consequently, if the rival's reaction parameter were known to the dominant firm, a myopic policy would be optimal, In the presence of imperfect information about the rival's unknown reaction parameter, the dominant firm acts in a Bayesian manner by updating its prior distribution based on the observations of the rival's outputs. Because of the multiplicative shape of the rival's reaction function, the Bayesian updating rule is a function of the dominant firm's decision variable, i.e. its output decisions. This creates a dependence of the future value of the dominant firm on the present output decision, and hence a myopic policy is not, in general, optimal. It is shown that through output experimentation the dominant firm will tend to overproduce and, consequently, will increase its expected discounted profits (market value).     

Optimal steady-state in stationary consumption-loan type models

We consider a stationary overlapping generations economy, and prove that an optimal steady state exists. We show that if a government intervention is needed in order to implement the optimal steady state as a competitive equilibrium, it is necessary only in a finite number of periods. If the interest rate associated with the optimal steady state equals the population rate of growth, some outside money may be required in order to make the competitive equilibrium follow the optimal steady state. We show that our existence result enables us to construct Pareto optimal competitive equilibria in some important cases.     

PARTIAL EXERCISE OF LOAN COMMITMENTS UNDER ADAPTIVE PRICING

The partial takedown phenomenon associated with bank loan commitments is examined in a dynamic context in which banks adjust commitment prices to client takedown behavior. The optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness and a decreasing function of the time the client plans to remain with its present bank and the cost of switching to a new bank. Since the bank's learning is cumulative, the longer a client remains with its bank the smaller is the commitment price adjustment resulting from an aberrant takedown. The enhanced commitment price certainty, obtained with longevity of the client relationship, helps to explain client reluctance to switch banks. Since the optimal takedown is an increasing function of client riskiness under adaptive pricing, such pricing may serve the added purpose of providing information on client risk.     

Efficient sets with and without the expected utility hypothesis

Consider a feasible set, X, of c.d.f.'s. Assume that the set of decision makers, who must choose from X, includes non-expected utility decision makers who are risk averse in some weaker notions. We show that in this case the efficient set of X expands relative to the expected utility case. We characterize the efficient sets for each notion of risk aversion including the expected utility case. It is also shown that the limited-coverage insurance policies, which are not efficient under the expected utility hypothesis, belong to the efficient set when weakly risk-averse non- expected utility functionals are assumed to exist.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

Between the Individual and the Community: Residential Patterns of the Haredi Population in Jerusalem

This article examines how different levels of internal organization are reflected in the residential patterns of different population groups. In this case, the Haredi community comprises sects and sub‐sects, whose communal identity plays a central role in everyday life and spatial organization. The residential preferences of Haredi individuals are strongly influenced by the need to live among ‘friends’ — that is, other members of the same sub‐sect. This article explores the dynamics of residential patterns in two of Jerusalem's Haredi neighbourhoods: Ramat Shlomo, a new neighbourhood on the urban periphery, and Sanhedria, an old yet attractive inner‐city neighbourhood. We reveal two segregation mechanisms: the first is top‐down determination of residence, found in relatively new neighbourhoods that are planned, built and populated with the intense involvement of community leaders; the second is the bottom‐up emergence of residential patterns typical of inner‐city neighbourhoods that have gradually developed over time.     

Systematic mistakes in the mortgage market and lack of financial sophistication

Institutions often offer a menu of contracts to consumers in an attempt to create a separating equilibrium that reveals borrower types and provides better pricing. We test the effectiveness of a specific set of contracts in the mortgage market: mortgage points. Points allow borrowers to exchange an upfront amount for a decrease in the mortgage rate. We document that, on average, points takers lose about $700. Also, points takers are less financially savvy (less educated, older), and they make mistakes on other dimensions (e.g., inefficiently refinancing their mortgages). Overall, our results show that borrowers overestimate how long they will stay with the mortgage.     

Beyond workaholism: Towards a general model of heavy work investment

Although the term workaholism is widely used, little consensus exists about its meaning, and there is a great need for further theoretical and methodological advancement. We attempt to address this need by introducing the concept of Heavy Work Investment (HWI), and viewing workaholism as only one of its subtypes. Furthermore, we propose a model consisting of four main components: HWI, its possible predictors, its types, and its outcomes.In this model, using Weiner's (1985) attributional framework, we differentiate between situational and dispositional types of HWI, each with its own subtypes, as based on the predictors of such an investment. For example, financial-needs-based and employer-directed are situational subtypes, whereas workaholism and work-devotion are dispositional subtypes. Based on the proposed HWI model, we compare dispositional investors with situational investors.Finally, the measurement of HWI, as well as future research directions (study of situational investors, research across time and cultures, and exploration of inter-generational similarity/difference) is also discussed.     

Economic implications of better information in a dynamic framework

Summary. We consider an OLG model with accumulation in human capital and analyze the economic implications of information about individual skills. Agents in each period differ by the random innate ability assigned to each individual. When young, all agents are screened for their abilities and this screening process (signal) constitutes a public information which is used in choosing the level of private investment in education. We demonstrate that in the presence of risk sharing markets better information may be harmful for all in equilibrium, and find conditions under which better information either enhances growth or reduces growth.Received: 8 September 2003, Revised: 3 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D80, J24.Correspondence to: Bernhard EckwertWe are pleased to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of R. Benabou, Z. Eckstein, E. Helpman, B. Ravikumar and D. Tsiddon. Also, special thanks are given to two anonymous referees. This research was supported by a Grant from G.I.F., the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development.