Bringing science to market: commercializing from NIH SBIR awards

We offer empirical information on the correlates of commercialization activity for research projects funded through the US National Institutes of Health's (NIH's) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) award program. Based on this analysis we suggest possible recommendations for improving this aspect of the performance of NIH's SBIR program. Specifically, we estimate a model of the probability of commercialization as a function of the project's ability to attract additional developmental funding, along with other control variables. We find that additional developmental funding from non-SBIR federal sources and from own internal sources are important predictors of commercialization success, relatively more so than additional developmental funding from venture capitalists. We also find, among other things, that university involvement in the underlying research increases the probability of commercialization. Thus, these factors should be considered by NIH when making awards, if increased commercialization is an objective.     

Section 401(k), 403(b) and 457(b) plans: who can do what?

This article examines the three main types of supplementary pension arrangements. It focuses on their origins and development, employer eligibility, deferral and contribution limits, funding arrangements and other technical requirements as they have been affected by recent developments.     

Complexity and the limits to learning

In this paper we look at the manner in which ideas coming from complexity science change our understanding of the cognitive powers of agents that is really necessary to explain the evolution of markets and of firms. The general ideas behind complex systems dynamics and evolution are presented and then two examples are treated in detail. The first in an evolutionary model of a market in which some new product is developed by competing firms and their “task” is to find a strategy in terms of quality and price that will be sustainable. This essentially requires agents/firms to discover mutually compatible strategies, and to create thereby sustainable market niches. The second example considers the internal structure of firms, in terms of their constituent working practices and skills. It demonstrates that it is precisely their ignorance of the consequences of adopting any particular practice that generates diversity in the emergent capabilities of firms, exploring the dimension of potential demand and therefore leading to a successful and sustainable business sector. The work supports the notion that the cognitive abilities that are involved are not about deduction and logic, as a traditional view of rationality might suggest, but are about the development and contraction of interpretive frameworks, which will be different for each player. The paper links these examples to a general recognition of the idea that complex, multi-agent systems evolve through successive “structural attractors”—multi-dimensional dynamical systems—with temporary structural stability. Because real systems contain both the structure and deviations from it, then there is a constant probing of structural stability and the possibility of qualitative change to a new structural attractor. This resembles the ideas in biological evolution related to “punctuated equilibria,” but it also links this to the idea of emergent and evolving networks of interaction, never of course near thermodynamic equilibrium.      

Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs

Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1–t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integer (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all but persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1–1/4.We are grateful to Roy Mathias and Daniel Waterman for help with some technical matters, and to chairman Jim Follain and the Syracuse University Economics Department for financing the exchange that launched this project. Campbell's research was funded by National Science Foundation grants, SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

Monetising the Classical Equations: a theory of circulation

The Classical Equations describe output and income in real terms.To use them to analyse aggregate demand, the transactions theydescribe must be ‘monetised’. A sum of money equalto the wage bill of the capital goods sector can be shown tobe necessary and sufficient to carry out all transactions, ina process of circulation which also defines an expression forvelocity. When money has intrinsic value, the quantity approachmay hold in the short run but, in the long run, money will beendogenous. In these conditions, the rate of interest will bedetermined by the supply and demand for reserves, but when moneyis purely nominal, only a minimum rate will be fixed, and therate of interest will have to be pegged. The Appendix developsthe Classical Equations and shows that they define an invariableunit of account.     

On the dynamics of inflation persistence around the world

We study the dynamics of inflation persistence in 45 countries for the period 1960–2008 using a recently developed test for multiple changes in persistence, which decomposes the sample information between adjacent I (0) and I (1) periods. We find that: (i) inflation persistence and average inflation tend to fall and rise at the same time; (ii) in some countries there are changes in the level of inflation which do not seem to be related to changes in inflation persistence; (iii) around half of the countries analyzed do not present any burst of I (1) behavior, and hence have stationary inflation throughout; (iv) for the other half, we detect switches of the type I (0) ? I (1) ? I (0), hence, inflation persistence, when it has occurred, has been temporal; and, (v) for about half of the countries in which inflation has presented I (1) behavior, persistent inflation lasted more than a decade. In addition, we find that in the last 50 years there have been mainly two episodes where long bursts of I (1) inflation took place simultaneously among groups of countries. In general, the “Great Inflation” occurred during the seventies and eighties in advanced economies, whereas it occurred during the eighties and nineties in emerging economies, particularly in Latin America.     

TOURISM AND REGIONAL IMMISERIZATION

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the consequences of tourism in rural and urban areas on regional incomes, welfare and urban unemployment using a generalized Harris Todaro model. In this model two urban and two rural goods are produced. A distinguishing characteristic of this model is that the urban non-traded good is not consumed in the rural region and, similarly, the rural non-traded good is not consumed in the urban region. The most important result we obtain is that a tourist boom in the urban region may immiserize the rural area. Hence the welfare interests of rural and urban consumers may be in conflict as a result of tourist expansion in the urban region.     

Institutional Ownership, Strategic Choices and Corporate Efficiency: Evidence from Japan

Based on the tenets of capital allocation systems theory, stewardship theory, and 'going concern' concept of business, institutional ownership is proposed to affect corporate productivity, both directly and indirectly, in large Japanese corporations through a set of four firm-level choices: product/market development, R&D intensity, capital intensity, and leverage. Using data on 118 corporations drawn from five industry sectors in Japan, and applying a partial mediation technique, this study tests an integrated, causal model of the relationships among these variables. Results show mixed support for the model. No direct relationship between institutional ownership and productivity is observed. However, institutional ownership affects productivity indirectly through R&D intensity and leverage. Although product/market development and capital intensity also affect productivity, institutional ownership has no significant relationship with them.     

Prison Labor: The Local Effects of Ohio Prison Industries

Prison labor has both positive and negative effects. Keeping prisoners active, training and socializing them to be productive citizens after prison, and helping to pay for their incarceration are some of the positives. Potential crowding out of free labor and industry is the major potential negative. This paper addresses the quantitative financial and employment consequences on local free labor and industry of prison industries in Ohio using an input–output model for Ohio. Based on the analysis, prison industries employment in Ohio has negligible to positive employment consequences for the Ohio economy and partially offsets the incarceration cost of the inmates who participate – providing between 5 and 10 percent of the incarceration cost in net cash flow and induced tax revenues.Presented at the 59th International Atlantic Economic Conference, London, March 9–13, 2005.     

Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation

This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.