A Strategy‐Proofness Characterization of Plurality Rule

Assuming at least four individuals and at least four alternatives, a social choice function on the domain of profiles at which there is an alternative ranked first by more individuals than any other alternative is nondictatorial, strategy‐proof, and has full range if and only if it is plurality rule.     

PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORGANIZATIONAL CONTRACTING

In this research we consider the interrelationships between professional interests and strategic flexibility. We specifically consider how the relative power of professional and managerial interests facilitate or constrain organizational contracting with external suppliers and providers. We explore these issues by focusing on hospitals competing in the health care industry during a period of heightened competitive and regulatory change. Our findings suggest that professional interests significantly influence the degree of external contracting. These findings have important implications for maintaining strategic flexibility in highly competitive environments.     

Bayesian Fraud Risk Formula for Financial Statement Audits

In this article we extend the work of Loebbecke et al. (1989 ) and illustrate the use of an evidential reasoning approach for developing fraud risk analysis models under the Bayesian framework. New formulations facilitating fraud risk assessments are needed because decision tree approaches previously used to develop analytical models are not appropriate in complex situations involving several interrelated variables. To demonstrate the evidential reasoning approach, a fraud risk assessment formula is derived and illustrated. The fraud risk formula captures the impact of the presence or absence of and interrelationships between the three ‘fraud triangle’ risk factors: Incentives, Attitude and Opportunities. The formula includes the impact of risks and controls related to these three fraud risk factors as well as the impact of forensic audit procedures and relevant analytical and other procedures that provide evidence for the presence or absence of fraud. This formula may be used in audit practice both to help plan the audit and to assess fraud risk sequentially as audit evidence is obtained.     

A Measure Of The Trade‐Off Between Responsiveness and Nondictatorship for Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

If individuals are never indifferent between distinct alternatives then for any transitive‐valued social welfare function satisfying IIA, and any fraction t, either the set of pairs of alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting more than one individual's preferences comprises at least the fraction t of all pairs, or else the fraction of pairs that have their social ordering determined independently of everyone's s preferences exceeds, or is very close to, 1 ?t. The Pareto criterion is not imposed. (There is also a version of this result for the domain of preferences that admit indifference.)