排序方式: 共有38条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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This paper develops a model of dynamic capital structure choice in the presence of recapitalization costs. The theory provides the optimal dynamic recapitalization policy as a function of firm-specific characteristics. We find that even small recapitalization costs lead to wide swings in a firm's debt ratio over time. Rather than static leverage measures, we use the observed debt ratio range of a firm as an empirical measure of capital structure relevance. The results of empirical tests relating firms' debt ratio ranges to firm-specific features strongly support the theoretical model of relevant capital structure choice in a dynamic setting. 相似文献
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This paper reports anomalous price behavior around repurchase tender offers. Buying shares before the expiration date of a repurchase tender offer and tendering to the firm produces, on average, abnormal returns of more than 9 percent over a period shorter than one week. In addition, we find that repurchasing companies experience economically and statistically significant abnormal returns in the two years after the repurchase. The upward price drift is mainly caused by the behavior of the small firms in the sample. 相似文献
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Income Distribution and Demand-Induced Innovations 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an innovation-based growth model and study how income and wealth inequality affect economic growth. We identify a (positive) price effect—where increasing inequality allows innovators to charge higher prices and (negative) market-size effects—with higher inequality implying smaller markets for new goods and/or a slower transition of new goods into mass markets. It turns out that price effects dominate market-size effects. We also show that a redistribution from the poor to the rich may be Pareto improving for low levels of inequality. 相似文献
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This paper relates cross-sectional differences in returns on Japanese stocks to the underlying behavior of four variables: earnings yield, size, book to market ratio, and cash flow yield. Alternative statistical specifications and various estimation methods are applied to a comprehensive, high-quality data set that extends from 1971 to 1988. The sample includes both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms, companies from both sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and also delisted securities. Our findings reveal a significant relationship between these variables and expected returns in the Japanese market. Of the four variables considered, the book to market ratio and cash flow yield have the most significant positive impact on expected returns. 相似文献
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This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses. 相似文献
26.
All trades executed by 37 large investment management firms from July 1986 to December 1988 are used to study the price impact and execution cost of the entire sequence (“package”) of trades that we interpret as an order. We find that market impact and trading cost are related to firm capitalization, relative package size, and, most importantly, to the identity of the management firm behind the trade. Money managers with high demands for immediacy tend to be associated with larger market impact. 相似文献
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In a recent article, MacMinn [5] argues that the presence of forward markets eliminates the incentives of the firm's manager to choose production levels that maximize firm value. In this comment, we show that his results do not depend on the presence of forward markets. The critical assumptions are that the manager is endowed with money rather than stock in the firm and that there is no competitive labor market for managers. In addition, his results require time-inconsistent behavior on the part of the firm's manager. 相似文献
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We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage. 相似文献