Legalization of drugs: Effects on the workplace

In the last few years bipartisan support for legalizing drugs has grown to a surprising level. Because of the lack of involvement of the business community in this debate, we surveyed the human resource managers of 127 firms about their perceptions of the effects of legalization. Their responses were uniformly negative, with expectations that drug use, absenteeism, worksite crime, and liability costs would increase, while the quality and quantity of work would decline. They also forecast increases in drug testing, performance monitoring, and education and rehabilitation programs as a result.     

Punishment in a Regulatory Setting: Experimental Evidence from the VCM

To analyze the effectiveness of punishment in inducing regulatory compliance, we modify a standard public goods experiment to include a financial penalty for free riding. The design allows us to vary both punishment probability and severity. We introduce the punishment mechanism in both a one-time and a repeated treatment and find that compliance (contributing to the public good) is increasing in expected punishment cost in both treatments. We also find that punishment severity has a larger effect on behavior than punishment probability. In the repeated treatment, we find that past punishment has a negative rather than positive effect on compliance.     

Competitiveness of the Euro Zone Manufacturing: A Panel Data Analysis

The purpose of this paper is to assess the main aspects involved in the competitiveness of manufacturing industries in the Euro zone area (EZ-12). To this end, we apply the generalized method of moments to a panel data error correction model. Our sample spans the period from 1970 to 2007, and our findings provide insight into the impact of manufacturing on the international competitiveness of European firms and industries. From the estimated magnitude of the relevant coefficients, we conclude that in the long run, a change in labor and capital compensation is not fully passed on to manufacturing growth, while an increase in the market power of the manufacturing sector will negatively affect its competitiveness.     

Good News and Bad News: Search from Unknown Wage Offer Distributions

The largest market in national economies is the labor market. Labor market contracting is characterized by job search, often from unknown wage offer distributions. This paper reports experimental tests of finite horizon models of job search in which the wage offer distribution is unknown. Theoretically-optimal search from an unknown wage offer distribution can have the seemingly paradoxical property that some offers will be accepted that are lower than other offers that will be rejected in the same period of the search horizon. Thus the reservation wage property (or lowest acceptable wage path) may not exist. This can occur because an offer that is a priori relatively high (good news) can imply that it is highly probable that search is from a favorable distribution, and such an offer can look unattractive when it is an a posteriori relatively low offer from a favorable distribution (bad news). This paper reports results from experimental treatments for search from unknown distributions in which the reservation wage property does exist and treatments in which it does not exist. We find that the consistency of search behavior with search theory reported in earlier papers is robust to the presence or absence of the reservation wage property and to whether the draws come from known or unknown distributions.     

Functional marketing plan development in department store retailing

Retailers are now implementing the types of formal marketing planning programs that have long characterized consumer goods firms. The functional marketing plans that are developed tend to be a year or less in duration. The primary responsibility for developing the plans resides with the general merchandise manager. The planning efforts of the retailing executive, in spite of their short term nature, do reflect an awareness of the importance of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of competitors and of the need to spell out issues involving profit planning, sales promotion planning, merchandise addition/deletion decisions, and issues involving inventory/physical distribution. A variety of marketing plans are developed. Separate plans are developed by merchandise lines in many organizations. The authors wish to express their appreciation to The Conference Board for permission to use the questionnaire, with modifications, underlying research for The Marketing Plan, Report No. 801, The Conference Board, 1981, as the basis for formulating the questionnaire used in this research     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.