Effects of organizational process change on responsibility accounting and managers’ revelations of private knowledge

We report the results of a nine-year field study that examines how responsibility accounting (RA) is used to manage horizontal relationships among several responsibility center (RC) managers including those who work on committees or cross-functional teams. We find theory-consistent evidence that the goal-congruent design or redesign of accounting and participation practices in general, and of RA in particular, depends on the magnitude, scope, and speed of organizational process change. When there is a change in the magnitude, scope, and speed of organizational process change, we find that the measurability of RC managers’ financial performance can change, and we also find that using RA to manage RC boundaries is an important mechanism for achieving goal-congruent behavior and avoiding dysfunctional behavior. Moreover, we show that several accounting and participation practices (e.g., activity-based costing, open book accounting, project budgeting, cross-functional teams) support RC boundary management that involves framing or reframing RC boundaries so as to influence competitive or cooperative behavior among RC managers. Finally, this study contributes by introducing a new research method to the accounting literature that is effective in structuring and interpreting longitudinal field data in relation to theoretical expectations.     

Management Roles and Sustainability Information. Exploring Corporate Practice

Little empirical research has been conducted on perceptions of the types of sustainability information dealt with by different managers in internal company processes. In this study the roles of different managers are distinguished based on contingency theory and using the categorisation in the sustainability balanced scorecard concept. Expected sustainability information types are identified for these roles and hypotheses are derived and tested about perceptions of the types of sustainability information in different management roles. Interviews identified 116 roles involved with sustainability information in a set of leading German and UK sustainability reporting companies. Results from analysing sustainability information types contingent upon different management roles contribute to the understanding of sustainability accounting systems and practices and how companies can best support different management roles with appropriate sustainability information.     

The empire strikes back: Adam Smith,John Stuart Mill,and the Robust Political Economy of empire

Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought, we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so, we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy, which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so, we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.     

How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social,Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof.     

Employment and Prices in a Simple Macroeconomy

This exercise sets up interlinked labor and goods markets in a classroom macroeconomy. Students with worker roles are endowed with labor that can be consumed or sold to firms that post wages, purchase labor, and produce goods that can be either consumed or sold to workers. The money from sales is used by firms to purchase labor in the next period. Complicated record keeping is avoided by using ordinary playing cards to represent money and goods. The exercise can stimulate a discussion of potential output, unemployment, and the role of money in determining wages and prices. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory macroeconomics classes to teach concepts of the circular flow, real and money wages, unemployment, and labor market equilibrium and in intermediate classes to consider Keynesian and quantity theories. Time required: Fifteen minutes for reading instructions, 30 to 45 minutes for trading (depending on the number of periods), and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one copy of the instructions for each person and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each replicated group of two workers and one firm. No money or other incentives are required.