The HR department's contribution to line managers' effective implementation of HR practices

The implementation of human resource (HR) practices (HRPs) is increasingly regarded as a cornerstone in the achievement of overall HRM effectiveness. This article addresses the role of the HR department in contributing to line managers' (LMs) effective implementation of HRPs. It does so by comparing the actions of HR departments in both effective and ineffective implementation processes in different firms. Its findings reveal that HR departments can make a difference by taking initiatives that foster LMs' implementation abilities, motivation and opportunities, such as deploying in‐the‐field HR specialists, framing practices in appealing ways, involving LMs in the development of HRPs and seeking CEO support, among others. By fleshing out these HR initiatives and linking them to the AMO framework, we build an inductive model that offers a more nuanced view of what HR departments can do to have their proposals effectively implemented by LMs.     

How Did Finance Capital Infiltrate the World of the Urban Poor? Homeownership and Social Fragmentation in a Spanish Neighborhood

When working‐class localities in developed countries are in question, social fragmentation is often analyzed along ethnic lines. Instead, this article claims that it is more critically fruitful to explore fragmentation in terms of people's relations with the state and different forms of capital. It does this by considering housing in Spain as a key resource that connects state policies both with the forms of reproduction and (dis)organization of the disadvantaged, and with the development of real estate and finance capital. First, it unfolds the historical formation of the Spanish ‘homeownership culture’ and the construction–finance complex. Second, starting from an in‐depth ethnography of a peripheral neighborhood in Barcelona, it emphasizes the embeddedness of recent financialization in the livelihood strategies of poor households. Finally, it shows how the process led to a commodification and erosion of those social relations on which it partially depended, thereby exposing problems for class reproduction and fracture lines among the urban poor.     

THE DISTANCE PUZZLE AND LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: AN UPDATE

The ‘distance effect' measuring the elasticity of trade flows to distance has been found to be rising since the early 1970s in a host of studies based on the gravity model, leading observers to call it the ‘distance puzzle'. However, this puzzle is regularly challenged by new developments in the specification of the gravity equation or in its estimations. We propose an original survey on the existing methods used to quantify the distance puzzle – basically the computation of an average distance of trade, a meta‐analysis on existing gravity papers and the implementation of recent econometric developments, all on a well‐specified gravity equation both in cross‐section and panel data. We apply all these methods to a unique large database (124 countries from 1970 to 2006). It appears that if all these new developments can change the amplitude of the increase in the trade elasticity to distance, none solve the distance puzzle. We confirm the existence of this puzzle and identify that it only applies to low‐income countries which exhibit a significant rising distance effect on their trade of around 18% between 1970 and 2006 while the distance ‘puzzle' for trade within richer countries disappears.     

Expatriate compensation and its link to the subsidiary strategic role: a theoretical analysis

This paper focuses on the strategic design of expatriates' salaries. Unlike standard expatriation literature that assumes a lack of connection between strategy and international managers' compensation, we use the theoretical concepts from the international strategic management research to discuss how different international strategies affect the way expatriates are compensated. In this respect, the paper proposes a series of hypotheses on how expatriate compensation systems take shape according to the role that the expatriates may play in the internationalization process. The hypotheses refer to the type of incentives offered to encourage acceptance of the assignment, the type of criteria used to evaluate their performance and the reference unit used to establish variable compensation.     

Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions? The Rise in Never‐Membership in Britain

This paper tracks the rise in the percentage of employees who have never become union members (‘never‐member’) since the early 1980s and shows that it is the reduced likelihood of ever becoming a member, rather than the haemorrhaging of existing members, that is behind the decline in overall union membership in Britain. We estimate the determinants of ‘never‐membership’ and consider how much of the rise can be explained by structural change in the labour market and how much by change in preferences among employees.     

Issue Information

The international human resource management (IHRM) field naturally lends itself to spotlighting the importance of internal and external organizational contexts to help understand how to manage employees in organizations effectively. However, we argue that the range of opportunities that the field creates to understand this context has not yet been fully embraced by IHRM scholars. To address this gap, this special issue explores: (a) the variety of approaches to theorizing how contexts promote or constrain organizational practice; and (b) relevant methodologies that might allow us to unearth novel context-dependent theory in international HRM. We propose a distinction between variable-oriented theorizing (that explains the effects of internal and external contexts on the phenomena under study) and context-dependent theorizing (that requires researchers become intimately familiar with the setting under study to understand context as a shaper of meaning). This editorial also highlights how the articles in the special issue contribute to stimulating further context-dependent IHRM research.     

When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller’s revenue than does the auction type. Consistent with the finding in Sade et al. (2006) that the discriminatory auction is more susceptible to collusion than the uniform-price auction, asymmetry in capacity constraints has a greater impact in discriminatory auctions.We thank Emmanuel Morales-Camargo, Ira Luria and Yelena Larkin for their excellent research assistance. We have benefited from comments by Yishay Yafeh, Eugene Kandel, Dan Levin, David Genesove, Eric Hughson, Steve Rock, Peter Bossaerts, David McAdams two anonymous referees, participants at the 2005 International Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Montreal, the 2006 winter meeting of the Econometric Society in Boston, and seminar participants at the University of Cincinnati, Hebrew University, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Tel-Aviv University, the University of Notre Dame, and Ben-Gurion University. Sade thanks the Israel Science Foundation (ISF 480/05) and the Krueger Center for Finance at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for partial financial support.     

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

An experimental approach is used to examine the performanceof three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory,uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenoussupply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent withtheoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatoryauction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than eitheruniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictionsand previous experimental results, it generates the lowest averagerevenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actualbid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatorypricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.     

Auctioning divisible goods

Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction. Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001