Testing uncovered interest rate parity using LIBOR

We test uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) using London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) interest rates for a wide range of maturities. In contrast to other markets, LIBOR markets have minimal frictions. Whereas most previous studies reject UIP, we find that UIP holds for several short-term LIBOR maturities using block bootstrap panel unit root tests suggested by Palm et al. (2011) and cointegration techniques by Westerlund (2007). Furthermore, the estimation results suggest that the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium marginally differs across the maturity of the underlying instrument, thus supporting the efficient market hypothesis.     

An empirical analysis of excess interbank liquidity: a case study of Pakistan

We investigate the drivers of excess interbank liquidity in Pakistan, using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag approach on weekly data for December 2005 to July 2011. We find that the financing of the government budget deficit by the central bank and nonbanks leads to persistence in excess liquidity. Moreover, we identify a structural shift in the interbank market in June 2008. Before June 2008, low credit demand was driving the excess liquidity holdings by banks. After June 2008, banks’ precautionary investments in risk-free securities drive excess liquidity holdings. Monetary policy is less effective if banks hold excess liquidity for precautionary reasons.     

Taylor Rules for the ECB using Expectations Data*

We estimate Taylor rules for the euro area using Consensus Economics data for expected inflation and output growth, and compare these estimates with more conventional specifications in which actual outcomes are used. We find that the ECB takes expected inflation and expected output growth into account in setting interest rates, while in the more conventional model specification, the coefficient of realized inflation is not significantly different from zero.     

Scenario-based design of cooperative systems

Over the past few years, scenario-based design has attained a growing interest as a way to incorporate a focus on the future use of an application into the construction of software. Scenarios have, however, mostly been used in the design of user-interfaces and hence focused on single-user situations. Based on experiences from applying scenarios in the re-design of an Hospital Information System in the Danish healthcare sector, this paper describes how collaborative scenarios can be used in the design of cooperative computer systems and what such col-laborative scenarios should contain. The paper concludes that such scenarios were useful in bridging the gab between understanding collaborative work practices and designing collaborative computer systems.     

Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence

Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation.     

Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB

Nowadays, it is widely believed that greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the information provided by a Taylor rule model in which real-time expected inflation and output growth are used. We use five indicators of ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an ECB policy meeting. Our results suggest that even though the indicators are sometimes quite different from one another, they add information that helps predict the next policy decision of the ECB. Furthermore, also when the interbank rate is included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant.     

Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?

This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies—contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries. The actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance. This explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices. First, it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post, thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies. Second, competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks, which otherwise conceal the recipient's choice of action. This enables the donor to give aid more efficiently.     

The Missing Link: China's Contracted Engineering Projects in Africa

This paper examines the driving forces of China's contracted engineering projects in Africa. Using data on contracted engineering projects in 52 African countries over the period 1991–2010, three groups of hypotheses are tested: (1) economic motives; (2) political ties between China and Africa; and (3) host country characteristics. We find that countries get more projects if they have large market potential and are political allies of China. Our results also suggest that Forums on China–Africa Cooperation promote projects in Africa. In contrast, host country characteristics are hardly related to the amount of engineering projects received.