Classification and aggregation: An application to industrial classification in cps data

In this paper we offer a method for deciding how to aggregate a set of elementary industries. The method is then applied to the problem of estimating a wage equation that allows for industry-specific effects. Our method explicitly formalizes the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and parsimony implicit in an aggregation problem. By varying the parameter of the assumed loss function, one obtains a whole sequence of aggregation levels. Further, the resulting sequence is consistent; that is, groupings formed at one level of aggregation will never be undone when one aggregates further.     

On the Role of Futures Trading in Spot Market Fluctuations: Perpetrator of Volatility or Victim of Regret?

We examine the role of index futures trading in spot market volatility. We use the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) approach to measure volatility, analyze causality and feedback relations between volatilities in the spot and futures markets, and test various hypotheses in the context of a multivariate model that incorporates other macrostate variables. Our empirical results suggest index futures trading may not be blamed for the observed volatility in the spot market. Rather, we find stronger and more consistent support for the alternative posture that volatility in the futures market is an outgrowth of a turbulent cash market. We use the regret (cognitive dissonance) theory to explain our results.     

Varietal Licensing Standards and Canadian Wheat Exports

Canada's wheat grading system is largely based on visual criteria and it is based on relatively high quality standards. A strict varieties licensing system exists to maintain the integrity of the grade standards. One of the consequences of the licensing system is that higher yielding, lower or different quality wheats have not been grown in Canada until recently. The basic objective of this paper is to examine some of the consequences of the regulatory strategy of limiting wheat production to the traditional high quality wheats. This question is analyzed in the context of important changes in the international grain markets. Using a partial equilibrium trade model this paper estimates that if higher yielding wheats were permitted to be grown, annual producer gains would be 5 to 17 percent of current net farm income.
Le classement des blés au Canada est basé sur des critères visuels qui sont de hautes qualités. Le système actuel d'homologation des variétés est tel que l'intégrité de ce système est maintenue. En conséquent, ce système n'a pas encouragé la cultivation des blés de hauts rendements ou des varietés différentes que tout récemment. L'objectif principal de cette étude est d'examiner quelques unes des conséquences de la stratégic de la réglementation visant à limiter la production du blé aux variétés de hautes qualités. Cette question est adressée dans le contexte des changements importants qui ont eu lieu dans le marché international des grains. A l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel des échanges, la présente étude démontre gu'en permettant la production des blés de hauts rendements, le gain annuel aux producteurs serait de 5 à 17 pourcent du revenue agricole net.     

Vulnerability and industrial hazards in industrializing countries: an integrative approach

The extra vulnerability of industrializing countries to environmental problems and industrial accidents cannot be understood or solved by a ‘normal’ scientific analysis. Aspects of the social and institutional context must be included, through analyses based on post-normal science. The standard two-dimensional classification of PNS is modified to have axes ‘social ‘and institutional vulnerabilities’ and ‘complexity of technological hazards’. The analysis is mainly applied to the case of the relatively rare accidents with catastrophic potential. In these, the deaths per accident in India, Mexico and Brazil are much greater than in the industrialized countries. This discrepancy arises partly from location of such plants near residential communities for marginalized workers and their families. Other socio-political factors are relevant, as the role of these countries in the global production system, the enforcement of safety and planning laws, quality of housing, and lifestyle of residents. Reducing the vulnerability of industrializing countries will therefore require major social policies and a comprehension of the limits of the normal scientific and economic approaches to such problems.     

Measuring the Impact of Regulation: A Study of Canadian Basic Cable Television

We evaluate the appropriateness of regulation within the Canadian cable television industry by applying both parametric and non-parametric approachesto measure scale efficiency. Although we begin with a sample offering adequatedegrees of freedom for parametric estimation, important policy issues lead us toconsider further estimation over sub-samples. Since some of these sub-samplesare small enough that parametric models cannot guarantee reliable estimates, weobtain production characteristics non-parametrically through data envelopmentanalysis. The nonparametric results for scale efficiency support the parametricresults. We find evidence against a natural monopoly argument that might havejustified continuation of the mandated monopolization of Canadian cable televisionservice. By the end of the sample period, there were no longer substantial economiesof scale in most relevant markets.     

Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?

Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like the Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL allow industrial facilities to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for inefficient command-and-control regulations. TR can significantly reduce participants' costs of complying with environmental regulations, but in doing so it can also give these participants a competitive advantage. Here we develop an analytical model to show that TR can have adverse welfare effects when if enables relatively inefficient firms in oligopolistic markets to “steal” market share from more efficient firms, and we characterize the regulatory policies that give rise to such outcomes. We also show that regulators' efforts to diffuse the benefits of site-specific agreements among nonparticipating firms dampen incentives to participate in TR.