A comparison of several approximations to the power function of the likelihood ratio test in covariance structure analysis*

In this paper we compare alternative asymptotic approximations to the power of the likelihood ratio test used in covariance structure analysis for testing the fit of a model. Alternative expressions for the noncentrality parameter (ncp) lead to different approximations to the power function. It appears that for alternative covariance matrices close to the null hypothesis, the alternative ncp's lead to similar values, while for alternative covariance matrices far from H_o the different expressions for the ncp can conflict substantively. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the ncp proposed in Satorra and Saris (1985) gives the most accurate power approximations.     

Risk and the miller equilibrium: Capital structure choice with risk-averse investors

Merton Miller's (1977) tax model of equilibrium capital structure choice results in capital structure irrelevance and the existence of tax clienteles, assuming the restrictive case of risk-neutrality. Relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality in Miller's tax framework, allowing utility-maximizing risk-averse investors, indicates that capital structure irrelevance continues to hold under reasonable assumptions about utility. Evaluation of resulting tax clienteles shows that marginal tax rates do not restrict investors from investing in equities but do affect the tax status of purchased bonds.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks

Consolidation in the banking industry has sparked concern about the survival of small banks, particularly as it relates to the availability of credit to small businesses. However, if small banks have an advantage in processing credit information, compared to large banks, they should continue to survive in a competitive environment. We evaluate risk-adjusted commercial loan yields (gross yields less net charge-offs and the risk-free rate of return) at small and large banks for the period of 1996 through 2001. Our primary finding is that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks earn greater risk-adjusted yields than larger banks. This result suggests that small banks make better choices from the available small business loans and is consistent with the notion that these banks have an information advantage in evaluating credit.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.     

Developing a cost-benefit analysis process for small-to-moderate expenditure decisions

During the Reagan administration, the federal government mandated the use of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) for regulatory decisions involving $100 million or more. While the use of CBAs has increased, less attention has been given to CBA processes involving smaller expenditures (regulatory and nonregulatory). As the federal budget tightens in the years ahead, the need to make hard decisions about these policies, programs, and technologies will increase. This paper describes a CBA process developed for the Office of Strategic Planning of the Social Security Administration; it was designed to handle small-to-moderate expenditure decisions (or for preliminary estimates of larger undertakings). A sample CBA using this process is provided, along with a discussion of the lessons that were learned from an initial application.     

There's something about saving …

The paper considers how people should plan their saving, given certain assumptions about inheritance and changes in household circumstances. The results are produced by a model that takes into account tax and state benefits as well as various private savings vehicles. It concludes that, for many households, saving for retirement through a ‘pension’ might not be optimum and that the best strategy is to vary the incidence and allocation of saving in response to changes in household circumstances.     

The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management: Evidence From the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers

Enterprise risk management (ERM) has captured the attention of risk management professionals and academics worldwide. Unlike the traditional "silo-based" approach to corporate risk management, ERM enables firms to benefit from an integrated approach to managing risk that shifts the focus of the risk management function from primarily defensive to increasingly offensive and strategic. Despite the heightened interest in ERM, little empirical research has been conducted on the topic. This study provides an initial attempt at identifying the determinants of ERM adoption. We construct a sample of firms that have signaled their use of ERM by appointing a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) who is charged with the responsibility of implementing and managing the ERM program. We use a logistic regression framework to compare these firms to a size- and industry-matched control sample. While our results suggest a general absence of differences in the financial and ownership characteristics of sample and control firms, we find that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely to appoint a CRO. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that firms appoint CROs to reduce information asymmetry regarding the firm's current and expected risk profile.