A critical examination of team-teaching of health care administration courses: student, faculty, and administration perspective

There are several teaching techniques adopted by faculty in order to provide information to students in the most effective manner. One of the relatively new teaching techniques is known as team-teaching. It has been observed that over the recent years this form of teaching has been gaining increasing interest and popularity among academicians. Nevertheless, there seems to be a great deal of confusion associated with team-teaching format. This paper attempts to clarify the various definitions and concerns that are associated with this form of teaching. The pros and cons of this form of teaching are discussed in detail.     

Separating uncertainty from heterogeneity in life cycle earnings

This paper develops and applies a method for decomposing crosssection variability of earnings into components that are forecastableat the time students decide to go to college (heterogeneity)and components that are unforecastable. About 60% of variabilityin returns to schooling is forecastable. This has importantimplications for using measured variability to price risk andpredict college attendance.     

Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

Computing optimal tax equilibria

This paper proposes a technique for computing optimal taxes in a full general equilibrium model. It is based upon a fixed point algorithm of the type that is widely used to solve Walrasian general equilibrium models. Computing an optimal tax equilibrium is more difficult than solving a general equilibrium model only to the extent that the derivatives of the social welfare function and of the consumer demand functions must be calculated in the former case. Solutions to several sample problems are provided to demonstrate the technique. They suggest that optimal tax rates are exceedingly sensitive to the specification of the model used to derive them.