Econometric Cost Structure Estimates for Cellular Telephony in the United States

This article estimates economies of scale for a sample of five cellular telephony firms in the United States. We reject constant returns to scale for all but the smallest firm studied; the remaining firms exhibit decreasing returns to scale. This finding suggests that scale economies cannot be used to justify the current regulated duopoly structure of United States cellular markets.     

VAR,ERROR CORRECTION AND PRETEST FORECASTS AT LONG HORIZONS

This paper focuses on the construction of forecasts over long horizons where a typical long-horizon forecast might span four years using 20 to 40 years’ data. It is argued that the presence of persistence in the form of unit or near-unit autoregressive roots poses substantial difficulties for long-horizon interval and point forecasting. These difficulties may not be overcome even by efficient pre-testing or model-selection procedures and might, in general, lead to point forecasts with large asymptotic root mean squared errors and undesirably wide prediction intervals.     

Advertising,Price and Quality in Self–regulating Professions: A Survey

This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between advertising, fees and quality in the self–regulating professions. Much of the literature is derived from the perspective of advertising as an information–enhancing device, helping to reduce the information asymmetry between professional and client. This is consistent with the majority of the empirical studies which suggest that advertising tends to have a downward effect on professional fees, with little if any adverse effect on quality. There are, however, important issues of method and measurement which may lessen the force of this conclusion     

Employee involvement in American corporations

At the direction of the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Governmental Affairs, the general Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a survey of employee involvement practices within American companies. The population consisted of top management within Fortune's 500 largest manufacturing and 500 largest service companies. An analysis of the data examined three broad areas relating to employee involvement: (1) the existing organizational programs and processes such as personnel practices, information sharing, and training; (2) the degree of corporate participation in specific employee involvement programs including the reasons for undertaking employee involvement programs, and the perceived barriers to the implementation of employee involvement programs; and (3) the perceived effect of employee involvement on organizational operation as measured by changes in indicators of performance and activities within the internal business environment.     

LESSONS FROM A MIDDLE MARKET LBO: THE CASE OF O.M. SCOTT

In 1986 The O.M. Scott & Sons Company, the largest producer of lawn care products in the U.S., was sold by the ITT Corporation in a divisional leveraged buyout. The company was founded in Marysville, Ohio in 1870 by Orlando McLean Scott to sell farm crop seed. In 1900, the company began to sell weedfree lawn seed through the mail. In the 1920s, the company introduced the first home lawn fertilizer, the first lawn spreader, and the first patented bluegrass seed. Today, Scott is the acknowledged leader in the “do-it-yourself” lawn care market, with sales of over $300 million and over 1500 employees. Scott remained closely held until 1971, when it was purchased by ITT. The company then became a part of the consumer products division of the huge conglomerate, and operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary for 14 years. In 1984, prompted by a decline in financial performance and rumors of takeover and liquidation, ITT began a series of divestitures. Over the next two years, total divestitures exceeded $2 billion and, after years of substandard performance, ITT's stock price significantly outperformed the market. On November 26, 1986, in the midst of this divestiture activity, ITT announced that the managers of Scott, along with Clayton & Dubilier (C & D), a private firm specializing in leveraged buyouts, had agreed to purchase the stock of Scott and another ITT subsidiary, the W. Atlee Burpee Company. The deal closed on December 30. Clayton & Dubilier raised roughly $211 million to finance the purchase of the two companies. Of that $211 million, almost $191 milion, or 91% of the total, was debt: bank loans, subordinated notes, and subordinated debentures. The $20 million of new equity was distributed as follows: roughly 62% of the shares were held by a C & D partnership, 21% by Scott's new subordinated debtholders, and 17.5% by Scott management and employees. After this radical change in financial structure and concentration of equity ownership, Scott's operating performance improved dramatically. Between the end of December 1986 and the end of September 1988, sales were up 25% and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) increased by 56%. As shown in Table 1, this increase in operating earnings was not achieved by cutting back on marketing and distribution or R & D. In fact, spending on marketing and distribution increased by 21% and R & D spending went up by 7%. Capital spending also increased by 23%.