The Quality of Smallholder Coffee in South Sumatra: The Production of Low-Quality Coffee as a Response to World Demand 1

Improving the quality of Indonesia's coffee exports has been a priority of government and the Association of Indonesian Coffee Exporters for some years. Efforts to achieve this objective have, however, been hampered by misconceptions about the reasons why coffee producers and traders at each point in the marketing network do not deliver a higher quality product. The research reported here shows that price premia for higher quality coffee are not large enough to encourage greater quality enhancement. The world market for low to medium grades, used in the production of instant coffee, is much larger than that for high-quality coffee, and this preference is transmitted in the form of low incentives to improve the product. Failure to understand this has led to government policies which at best do not solve the quality problem and at worst exacerbate it.     

Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices: Evidence from Assessing Macroeconomic Shocks

This paper outlines a simple macro model with overlapping wage contracts to investigate how the temporary and permanent components of stock price movements may be related to aggregate macro-economic supply and demand disturbances. In the content of the model, we show that aggregate demand shocks have only temporary effects on real stock prices, while supply shocks may affect the level of real stock prices permanently. Moreover, the temporary component in U.S. stock prices, identified by placing appropriate structural restrictions on a vector autoregressive system estimated for the postwar period, is statistically significant. This evidence supports the mean-reversion hypothesis that stock prices are not pure random walks. The finding is robust to the choice of variables used in the vector autoregressive system and periodicity.     

Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the NBA

We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) to analyze the impact of minimum salaries on an employee's career length. The NBA has a salary structure in which the minimum salary a player can receive increases with the player's years of experience. The NFL has a similar minimum wage policy; research suggests that the introduction of this system shortened career length in the NFL. Using duration analysis, we fail to find evidence that the new multi‐tiered minimum wage scale in the NBA increased the probability of exit.     

Salespersons as Internal Knowledge Brokers and New Products Selling: Discovering the Link to Genetic Makeup

Managers increasingly realize the importance of involving the sales force in new product development. However, despite recent progress, research on the specific role of the sales force in product innovation‐related activities remains scarce. In particular, the importance of a salespersons' internal knowledge brokering has been neglected. This study develops and empirically validates the concept of internal knowledge brokering behavior and its effect on selling new products and developing new business, and explores whether a salesperson's internal brokering qualities are determined by biological traits. The findings reveal that salespeople with the DRD2 A1 gene variant engage at significant lower levels of internal knowledge‐brokering behavior than salespeople without this gene variant, and as a result are less likely to engage effectively in new product selling. The DRD4 gene variant had no effect on internal knowledge brokering. Management and future research implications are discussed.     

Distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty

When suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain, they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer. This paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts, each of which consists of a mixture of constant per-unit wholesale prices, buy-back arrangements, and post sale payments contingent on sales made, such as revenue sharing or buybacks. We show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly, thereby generating the supplier's preferred inventory configuration and price distribution. We extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly, demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution, given the choices of its rival. Distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers' standpoint, even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty, and, given the perfect competition among distributors, all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers. Thus, suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand, and without the need to control dealer actions in detail. In particular, suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices, but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion.     

The effect of alternative goals on earnings management studies: An earnings benchmark examination

Firms’ management manages earnings because they have incentives or goals to do so. Earnings management studies have to account for these different goals as tests of earnings management can be compromised by the effect of conflicting goals. I illustrate this in the setting of Dechow et al. (2003). Their study examines whether firms with small profits and firms with small losses (loss-avoidance benchmark) have differing levels of discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (2003) find that firms just above the loss-avoidance benchmark do not have discretionary accruals that are significantly different than firms just below the benchmark. However, they do not consider firms just below the loss-avoidance benchmark that might be using discretionary accruals to avoid missing an alternative benchmark. I find that after I consider these alternate earnings benchmark goals, firms just above the benchmark have significantly higher discretionary accruals. This provides direct evidence that the ‘kink’ in the distribution of earnings arises from earnings management. I find similar results for the earnings changes benchmark. These findings highlight the need to consider alternative earnings benchmark goals when examining firms immediately around benchmarks.     

Escape from New York: The market impact of loosening disclosure requirements

We examine the first significant deregulation of U.S. disclosure requirements since the passage of the 1933/1934 Exchange and Securities Acts: the 2007 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 12h-6. Rule 12h-6 has made it easier for foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and thereby terminate their U.S. disclosure obligations. We show that the market reacted negatively to the announcement by the SEC that firms from countries with weak disclosure and governance regimes could more easily opt out of the stringent U.S. reporting and legal environment. We also find that since the rule's passage, an unprecedented number of firms have deregistered, and these firms often had been previous targets of U.S. class action securities lawsuits or SEC enforcement actions. Our findings suggest that shareholders of non-U.S firms place significant value on U.S. securities regulations, especially when the home country investor protections are weak.     

Confidence,opinions of market efficiency,and investment behavior of finance professors

We identify finance professors’ opinions on the efficiency of the stock markets in the United States and assess whether their views on efficiency influence their investing behavior. Employing a survey distributed to over 4,000 professors, we obtain four main results. First, most professors believe the market is weak to semi-strong efficient. Second, twice as many professors passively invest than actively invest. Third, our respondents’ perceptions regarding market efficiency are almost entirely unrelated to their trading behavior. Fourth, the investment objectives of professors are, instead, largely driven by the same behavioral factor as for amateur investors–one's confidence in his own abilities to beat the market, independent of his opinion of market efficiency.