Optimal new-product pricing in regulated industries

Intertemporal pricing issues faced by regulated monopolists in market settings characterized by high rates of innovation have received little attention in the regulatory economics literature. Most analyses of regulatory pricing have focused on monopolies characterized by a stable multiple-good product set. In a regulated industry characterized by technological change in the form of new products and services (such as telecommunications), optimal pricing decisions may also reflect intertemporal market and production factors. In this paper, two such intertemporal factors are modeled: learning curve effects on the firm's cost function, and customer demonstration effects on the demand side of the market. Inclusion of these factors leads to an intertemporal pricing rule that may conflict with the standard regulatory practice whereby each product or service must recoup its own resource costs period by period. Our results suggest that this regulatory practice can result in efficiency losses, since it results in a rate of technological diffusion that is too low.     

Some economics of content protection

We are grateful to a perceptive referee for many constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper entitled The Economics of Content Protection: A Dual Approach. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Managers’ Corporate Entrepreneurial Actions and Job Satisfaction

Through the development and extension of theories and scholars’ subsequent empirical analyses of significant, theoretically grounded research questions, the knowledge about corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and its successful use continues to advance. Moreover, the literature suggests important relationships between the corporate environment, managers’ entrepreneurial behavior and successful implementation of corporate entrepreneurship actions. In an attempt to test some of those relationships, we describe an empirical study of 523 managers that examines the relationships among the antecedents to managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, a decision to implement entrepreneurial actions, and resulting job satisfaction and reinforcement practices.     

The long-run relationship between private and public savings: An empirical note

This empirical note extends the recent work by Holmes (2006) in examining the long-run relationship between private and public savings in the U.S. over the post-World War II period. Standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration; however, once allowance is made for an endogenous break in the cointegrating relationship, the weak form of the Ricardian equivalence proposition is supported.     

Bank mergers and components of risk: An evaluation

The present study empirically examines the contribution of the acquired banks in only the nonconglomerate types of mergers (i.e., banks with banks), where the bulk of the payment is in the form of equity to the acquiring bank and finds overwhelmingly statistically significant evidence that nonconglomerate types of mergers definitely reduce the total as well as the unsystematic risk while having no statistically significant effect on systematic risk. Therefore, it seems that diversification may be a possible motive for bank mergers.     

Middle Managers' Divergent Strategic Activity: An Investigation of Multiple Measures of Network Centrality

abstract    Using a sample of 89 mid-level managers in a US based urban hospital, this study investigates relationships among three measures of network centrality and managers' divergent strategic activity. While prior work has demonstrated a relationship between managers' boundary-spanning responsibilities and strategic activity, inadequate attention has been paid to managers' internal network position. Drawing from established theory, we consider expected network flows associated with three elements of the strategic renewal process. From this, we hypothesize and test relationships among managers' divergent activity and three measures of network centrality. Our findings suggest specific relationships between alternative forms of network centrality and particular elements of the strategic renewal process. Consistent with existing research, the findings also show boundary-spanning managers to be more strategically active than their non-boundary-spanning counterparts.     

Zur Entscheidung y>y0 aufgrund der Messung einer korrelierten Variablen

Zusammenfassung Es wird eine optimale Strategie im Sinne des minimalen erwarteten Verlustes für die beiden Entscheidungeny>y _o undyy _o aufgrund der Messungen einer mitY positiv korrelierten, einfacher und/oder billiger zugänglichen ZufallsvariablenX abgeleitet. Dabei wird angenommen, daßX undY nach einer bivariaten Normalverteilung mit bekannten Parametern verteilt sind und die Entscheidungyy _o getroffen wird, wennx größer ist als ein zu bestimmendesx _o, und die Entscheidungy>y _o, wennx gleich oder kleiner als diesesx _o ist. Für die Bestimmung des optimalenx _o werden zunächst die Kosten für die beiden Fehlentscheidungen jeweils als konstant vorausgesetzt, in einem weiteren Ansatz wird jedoch für die Mißklassifikationyy _o eine mity exponentiell wachsende Risikofunktion angenommen. Um die relative Häufigkeit der zu erwartenden Fehlklassifikationen abschätzen zu können, wird schließlich die bedingte WahrscheinlichkeitP(x>x _o,y) errechnet.

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Summary An optimal strategy, with minimum expected risk, for the decisionsy>y _o oryy _o is constructed on the basis of the measurement of a variableX, which is positively correlated withY and can be measured more easily and/or with smaller expense. A bivariate normal distribution with known parameters is assumed forX andY. For the observationsx a limitx _o is aimed at, so that the decisionsy>y _o oryy _o are taken ifx>x orxx _o respectively. Optimal values ofx _o are first calculated under the assumption of constant losses for the two misclassifications (x>x _o ifyy _o andxx _o ify>y _o). In a further approach the loss for a wrong decisionyy _o is assumed to increase exponentially withy. Finally the conditional probabilityP (x>x _o\y) is calculated to get an assessment of the relative frequencies of wrong decisions to be expected.

     

Preventing HIV in injection drug users: exploring the tradeoffs between interventions

Injection drug users (IDUs) transmit the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) via both needle sharing and sex. Available interventions for this population have varying costs and effectiveness and focus on different risk behaviors. In this analysis, we look at two interventions. One is inexpensive, broad-based and provides modest risk reductions (street outreach (SO)); the other is narrowly focused, expensive and relatively effective (methadone maintenance). This analysis explores the effects of population risk behavior, intervention effectiveness, intervention costs, and decision constraints when allocating funds between these two interventions to maximize effectiveness. We develop a model of the spread of HIV, dividing IDUs into susceptibles (uninfected) and infectives, and separately portraying sex and injection risk. We simulate the epidemic in New York City for time periods from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and incorporate the behavioral effects of two interventions performed singly or in combination to find the allocation that maximizes the number of infections averted in the IDUs and their noninjecting sex partners, assuming interventions have increasing marginal costs. We find that the optimal allocation nearly always involves spending the maximum allowable amount on SO. This result is largely insensitive to variations in risk parameters, intervention efficacy, or cost. The model's structure, however, makes clear that many factors contribute to this insensitivity, namely the scope of the interventions, the dual drug/sex nature of HIV risk in the population, the asymmetry of sexual risk for men and women, and the potential benefits to nonIDUs.     

A General Method of Deriving the Inefficiencies of Banks from a Profit Function

This article develops a new method of estimating inefficiencies in joint production and shows that unlike the approaches utilized in the previous studies of inefficiency, this method maintains a consistent relationship between the error term of a profit function and the error terms of its price derivatives. A useful by-product of the method is a proof of a Hotelling-like lemma that relates stochastic input demand and output supply functions to stochastic profit functions. While the previous studies fit a single frontier to data on all firms, this paper estimates a frontier unique to every observed firm to allow each one to have a different potential of achieving maximal levels of profit. The new method is applied in the analysis of annual data, 1984–1989, for U.S. commercial banks. Both the analytical and numerical results of the paper show that the residual that the previous studies attribute to inefficiency includes the effects of excluded variables and of inaccuracies in the specified functional forms. Once accurate estimates of these effects are subtracted from the residual, the distortions in the measured inefficiencies should be considerably reduced. Consequently, this article considers how such estimates might be obtained.