Strategic benefits to firms issuing private equity placements

For young technology firms, acquiring resources can often be costly due to the information asymmetry and uncertainty that exist surrounding the new technology. We contend that firms able to issue private equity can better manage their ability to mobilize three kinds of resources: capital, research partners, and commercial partners. We investigate the existence of long‐term, strategic benefits to private placements, and a number of factors may determine the long‐term effectiveness of this governance form. Overall, the empirical analyses demonstrates that private placements provide long‐term benefits to firms by reducing hazards associated with information asymmetry. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder management and the stakeholder matrix: Potential strategic marketing tools

This article examines how marketers may be able to apply the stakeholder management process and the stakeholder matrix to marketing strategy formation. Existing marketing theory does not utilize the stakeholder management process when undertaking strategic marketing planing, although most marketing theory implicitly identifies the need to develop strategies that address the needs of multiple groups or stakeholders. By understanding and applying stakeholder theory, marketers should be able to develop more effective marketing strategies. While there is extensive management literature examining stakeholder theory, there is little marketing literature in this area, and this article attempts to partially fill this gap.     

Designing the innovating organization

The innovating organization described is one that recognizes and formalizes the roles, processes, rewards, and people practices that naturally lead to innovations. The point we have emphasized throughout this article is that the organization that purposely designs these roles and processes is more likely to generate innovations than is an organization that doesn't plan for this function. Such a purposely designed organization is needed to overcome the obstacles to innovation. Because innovation is destructive to many established groups, it will be resisted. Innovation is contrary to operations and will be ignored. These and other obstacles are more likely to be overcome if the organization is designed specifically to innovate.Managers have tried to overcome these obstacles by creating venture groups, by hiring some entrepreneurs, by creating “breakthrough funds,” or by offering special incentives. These are good policies but by themselves will not accomplish the goal. Figure 1 conveyed the message that a consistent set of policies concerning structure, process, rewards, and people are needed. The innovating organization is illustrated in Figure 7. It is the combination of idea people, reservations in which they can operate, sponsors to supervise them, funding for their ideas, and rewards for their success that increase the odds in favor of innovation. Simply implementing one or two of these practices will result in failure and will only give people the impression that such practices do not work. A consistent combination of such practices will create an innovating organization that will work.     

A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The ‘‘Boomerang'’ Effect and Grant‐Back Clauses*

This article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed ‘‘grant‐back'’ clauses. Of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant‐back clause can mitigate this distortion. I also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant‐back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee's incentive to engage in R&D and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.     

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.     

Measuring children's attitudes toward TV commercials: An instrument reliability test

The research deals with an investigation of the reliability of a seven-item test developed by Rossiter (1977) to investigate children's attitudes toward TV commercials. A comparative analysis of the internal-consistency reliability, using Cronbach's alpha, and testretest reliability, using Pearson's r, is presented for two previous studies and the current effort. The effects of extension to a more diverse socioeconomic spectrum and to younger children are discussed. It is concluded that the test should be lengthened and administered to midmiddle and higher SES children. The latter condition is stated since reading skills appear to impinge on reliability scores. This research was supported by a fellowship and grant from the Faculty Research Fund, Western Michigan University. The author is indebted to Professor John R. Rossiter for suggestions concerning this task.     

An analysis of growth competitiveness

The publication of the Global Competitiveness Report 2005‐2006 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2005 World Economic Forum. 2005. The global competitiveness report, 2005–2006, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.  [Google Scholar]) has focused attention once more upon the relative abilities of many countries to compete in world markets. This article provides an analysis and evaluation of the approach taken by the WEF in constructing its measure of international growth competitiveness, the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI) which is used to rank countries. In particular, the study identifies three areas where the GCI is vulnerable to criticism. First, the treatment of outliers for hard data items is ambiguous and we identify alternative methods for dealing with outliers that are justifiable or even superior. Second, the crucial role of the variable utility patents in the calculation of the GCI is questioned and serious doubts concerning the use of this variable are raised. Third, the article suggests an alternative approach, based upon structural equation modeling, which should be used for the determination of weights in the index calculation process, rather than the arbitrary method adopted by the WEF.     

Market evidence of misperceived mortality risk

We construct and implement a test of rational consumer behavior in a high-stakes financial market. In particular, we test whether consumers make systematic mistakes in perceiving their mortality risks. We implement this test using data from secondary life insurance markets where consumers with a life-threatening illness sell their life insurance policies to firms in return for an up-front payment. We compare predictions from two models: one with consumers who correctly perceive their mortality risk, and one with consumers who are misguided about their life expectancy, and find that our data are most consistent with the predictions made by the second model.