RENT DISSIPATION AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PRICE POLICY

This paper uses a general equilibrium-based exchange economy model to examine rent seeking for a price policy. Opposing interests spend resources to influence the government's choice of a price vector. Rents, the willingness to pay for the policy, are determined endogenously from the Nash equilibirum of a non-cooperative game. Numerical simulations explore the degree to which rents are dissipated by wasteful rent seeking. It is found that dissipation, measured as the ratio of rent-seeking costs to rents garnered, can grow without limit, and is greatest when opponents are evenly matched. Dissipation is smallest with widely disparate groups, a result that might help explain the underdissipation that seems to occur in many industries.     

What happened after Bell spilled the acid?: Telecommunications history: a view through the literature

The article is an extensive review of the literature covering the history of telecommunications, primarily the telephone and telegraph. Much of the history itself is discussed in the process, including the politics of inventions, monopolies and anti-trust pressures, and industry interaction with government. The ignorance of many authors on the actual workings of the telephone is decried, and many sources for gaining an understanding of the technology are indicated.     

Matt Goldspan's trilogy

Matthew Goldspan was faced with a series of coincidental personnel issues that tested both his fairness and integrity. He had been a branch manager of a financial services operation for three years, where he oversaw thirty five employees. In one instance, a clerical employee protested salary differences she discovered; in another, his affirmative action record, as well as his right to make hiring decisions, was in question; and thirdly, he had to decide how to respond to theft by a temporary employee who happened to be the son of a prized member of his staff. In each case, employees were looking for Matt to demonstrate appropriate leadership and sound judgment.Jay Halfond is currently Associate Dean of the College of Business Administration at Northeastern University, where he also teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in social and ethical issues of management. He has published numerous articles, reviews, and cases on higher education administration and on ethical issues in management.     

Intrametropolitan migration: A simultaneous model of employment and residential location of white and black households

This study explores the relationship between the home and job location of the household within a metropolitan area. The model is an extension of the Alonso-Muth framework and allows the household to simultaneously choose its residential and employment location, monthly rent, number of rooms and the type of structure of the dwelling unit, so as to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint.The data base is the Home Interview Survey conducted in 1965 by the (San Francisco) Bay Area Transportation Study Commission. The coefficients in the simultaneous model are estimated by two-stage least squares. The cross-section sample is stratified by tenure into renters and homeowners; by race into black and white households; and further by position in the life-cycle.The results of the location equations reveal that both the home and job location are responsive to each other which implies that the decentralization of jobs will result in the decentralization of residences for black households. The results of the housing equations imply that black and white households have almost identical elasticity of demand for housing. There is very slight evidence of price discrimination against black households. However, there is evidence that black households do face a geographical segregated market for rental housing.The results of this study argue that the decentralization of population is not due solely to rising incomes and will continue as long as industry decentralizes. Furthermore, governmental policies of increasing the income of central city residents, through subsidies to employers to locate in the central city will have a strong effect: inducing those residents to remain in or move into the central city. Thus, a policy that is meant to alleviate the plight of the city center may only result in strengthening the racial and income split between the suburb and the central city inhabitants.     

Toward a direct contribution-reinforcement pay system

To make a pay system a source of reinforcement for contribution and give people an opportunity to participate in a reward program each year without the stigma of becoming “too expensive,” firms might consider making less than 100% of the total amount increase distributed to an individual a permanent part of his base salary. A part of the raise could be in effect for, say, a year.