A location-inventory model for large three-level supply chains

We study the location-inventory problem in three-level supply networks. Our model integrates three decisions: the distribution centers location, flows allocation, and shipment sizes. We propose a nonlinear continuous formulation, including transportation, fixed, handling and holding costs, which decomposes into a closed-form equation and a linear program when the DC flows are fixed. We thus develop an iterative heuristic that estimates the DC flows a priori, solves the linear program, and then improves the DC flow estimations. Extensive numerical experiments show that the approach can design large supply networks both effectively and efficiently, and a case study is discussed.     

Intertemporal price discrimination with two products

We study the two‐product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the established no‐discrimination‐across‐time result does not extend to two‐product sellers under standard taste distributions.     

On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof

We consider planning procedures which generalize the MDP procedure in the sense that, at each step, the planning bureau asks the agents their marginal rates of substitution, and uses the answers to revise the previously announced feasible programme. Such a procedure is “locally strategy proof” if, at each step, answering one's true marginal rate of substitution is the best myopic strategy for each agent. We give a general characterization of the family of locally strategy proof procedures and study its neutrality properties.     

The effects of price and message-sidedness on confidence in product and advertisement with personal involvement as a mediator variable

Attribution of confidence by consumers when the price of the product is known, has already been investigated in previous studies, as has been attribution of confidence from advertisements' sidedness. This study, based on a 2 × 3 × 2 (sidedness × price levels × type of product) factorial design, focuses in the interactive effects of price and message-sidedness, since consumers are rarely exposed to one single variable of the marketing strategy. A model is developped, which is articulated on the central concept of consumer involvement. It is found that under high involvement, high price enhances confidence in the product (but not in the advertisement), two-sided messages increase confidence in the advertisement (but not in the product). It is also shown that two-sided messages bring about higher-confidence in the product when price is at the medium level.     

Corporate portfolio management

Summary We solve the optimal portfolio problem in continuous time from the point of view of a corporation, acting on behalf of risk neutral shareholders. Our model fits for example the case of a commercial bank. Risk aversion is generated endogenously by financial frictions, and increases when the value of the firm’s assets decrease. We find a remarkably simple investment policy: invest a multiple of the firm’s equity into the risky asset, keep the rest as cash reserves, and distribute dividends when the value of the firm exceeds some threshold. As a consequence, the firm locally behaves as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern investor with constant relative risk aversion.We thank three anonymous referees for their comments.     

Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation

The canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent's participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract, typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type. Upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into the agents' outside options, we find that some of the received wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification. We develop a multi-dimensional methodology for addressing this class of problems, providing two important applications to nonlinear pricing. First, with nonlinear pricing by a monopolist the familiar "no-distortion-at-the-top" result persists, but in tandem with the surprising conclusion that there is either no distortion at the bottom or bunching. Second, in a simple model of product differentiated duopolists competing with nonlinear pricing we show that, generally, the duopoly outcome is qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome. However, when marginal costs are symmetric and competition is sufficiently intense, distortions disappear and the equilibrium outcome takes a remarkably simple form: efficient quality allocations with cost-plus-fee pricing.     

The impact of sustainable public procurement on supplier management — The case of French public hospitals

In the public sector, procurement managers are now required to comply with new sustainable regulations and to look for suppliers able to provide a sustainable offering. Stating that contracts can only frame part of the interaction and that parties often turn to more negotiated agreements, we investigate whether sustainable expectations within public hospitals could impact supplier management and imply rearrangements between public buyers and private providers. Data were collected from fifteen French hospitals through semi-structured interviews. Findings first highlight the sustainable expectations of public buyers from global key providers, and, second, that sustainable procurement does impact the relationship by creating new rules. Building on these results, managerial implications are suggested.     

Competition Among Health Plans: A Two‐Sided Market Approach

We set up a two‐sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two‐sided framework allows us to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of the competition depends mainly on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on the providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO receives a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that by highlighting the two‐sided market structure of the health plans' competition, our model provides a new insight to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share as observed in the USA during the last decade.     

Two‐sided markets: a progress report

We provide a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two‐sided markets and present new results. We identify two‐sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms, matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two‐sidedness. We build a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtain new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end‐users.