Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes–Negishi equilibria

The label "Keynes–Negishi equilibria" is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks: as posited in Negishi's 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics . Such equilibria are defined in a general equilibrium model, and shown to exist. Methodological implications are briefly discussed in a concluding section.     

An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem

Summary.  An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and some elementary calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights. Moreover, any intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing weights corresponds to a fixed point of the function. Furthermore, the proof can be used to show -balanced versions of the K-K-M-S Theorem, with -balancedness as introduced in Billera (1970). The proof makes clear that the conditions made with respect to by Billera can be even weakened. Received: January 22, 1996; revised version June 9, 1996     

The Firm as a Multicontract Organization

The firm is often considered as a nexus of contracts linking the management and its different stakeholders: claim-holders, workers, unions, customers, suppliers, and the state, among others. This paper surveys recent work in contract theory, the multiprincipal incentive theory, and the theory of side contracts, which provides some insights into the structure of those contracts and therefore into the structure of the firm. First, we discuss the incomplete contracting assumptions underlying these variations of the usual grand contract approach. Second, we explain how the theoretical lessons learned from this work—the distribution of contracting rights, the power of incentive schemes within organizations, and the design of communication channels—apply to the theory of the firm.     

Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure

Summary. Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences. Received: June 8, 1998; revised version: November 8, 1998     

Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive

The paper addresses the following question: how efficient is the market system in allocating resources if trade takes place at prices that are not competitive? Even though there are many partial answers to this question, an answer that stands comparison to the rigor by which the first and second welfare theorems are derived is lacking. We first prove a “Folk Theorem” on the generic suboptimality of equilibria at non-competitive prices. The more interesting problem is whether equilibria are constrained optimal, i.e. efficient relative to all allocations that are consistent with prices at which trade takes place. We discuss an optimality notion due to Bénassy, and argue that this notion admits no general conclusions. We then turn to the notion of p-optimality and give a necessary condition, called the separating property, for constrained optimality: each constrained household should be constrained in each constrained market. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, the case usually treated in the textbook, then this necessary condition is also sufficient. In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. When there are three or more commodities, two or more constrained households, and two or more constrained markets, this necessary condition is typically not sufficient and equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal.     

Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods

We analyze a public good problem when agents form a grand coalition to promote their own collective goal instead of that of society as a whole. When collusion takes place under symmetric information , the collusion-proof Samuelson rule takes a simple form that is close to an ex ante cost-benefit analysis . Then, we analyze the case where agents collude under asymmetric information . First, we describe the set of collusion-proof allocations. Second, we establish the collusion-proof Samuelson rule that highlights the role of coalitional virtual valuations . Asymmetric information within the coalition allows the principal to recover some flexibility in the design of the optimal policy. We finally discuss the nature of the inefficiency created by the agents' collusive behavior and the scope of their ex ante gain in forming a coalition.     

Reciprocal Supervision,Collusion and Organizational Design

We study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents. Each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent. We characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents. In particular, it is shown that better mutual information between agents may hurt the principal. The other main result is the possibility that it may be better to give up one supervisory function or to have a third party be the supervisor if possible. Finally, we show that such a dual supervisory structure raises the possibility that letting collusion happen may be the best policy.     

Information and the Production of Management in a Theory of the Firm

Abstract

I show that the three main contributions to the theory of the business of the last century – those of Cobb and Douglas (1928 Cobb, Charles W., and Paul H. Douglas. 1928. “A Theory of Production.” American Economic Review 18 (Supplement): 139–165. [Google Scholar]), Coase (1937 Coase, Ronald. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (16): 386–405.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), and Lucas (1978 Lucas Jr, Robert E. 1978. “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms.” Bell Journal of Economics 9 (3): 508–523.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) – are actually complementary and can be fitted into a general model of the firm size choice as the solution to a problem of optimal allocation of decision making in the economy. Decisions require information, and the availability and cost of information drives the optimization of firm size by the relevant decision makers - managers and entrepreneurs - pursuing the maximization of profits. Trends in firm size, and their reversals, are shown to depend on the aggregate information/output ratio.