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61.
Over the past 20 years, as the study of transparency has evolved into a burgeoning multidisciplinary field, nonprofit scholars have developed an impressive body of research on the antecedents and outcomes of the transparency of nonprofit organizations (NPOs). From both theoretical and practical purposes, it is necessary to develop an overall picture of such antecedents and outcomes, to allow scholars and NPOs to understand why, when, and how transparency should be implemented. Current studies provide a fragmented view, focused on specific elements of NPO transparency; with a systematic literature review of 76 articles, this article offers both an integrative framework of the antecedents and outcomes of NPO transparency and an agenda for research, based on a critical analysis of the integrative framework. Four relevant research orientations emerge: (1) direction of NPO transparency, (2) distinguishing actual from perceived transparency, (3) the dark side of NPO transparency, and (4) NPO transparency contingency factors. Research along these four orientations could add nuance to existing knowledge of transparency and provide key insights with regard to why, when, and how transparency works.  相似文献   
62.
Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well-known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non-cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm’s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow–Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the one in a transfer-free Drèze (pseudo-)equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm.  相似文献   
63.
REGULATION BY DUOPOLY   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
This paper analyzes, within the framework of the new regulatory economics that emphasizes asymmetries of information, the optimal structure of an industry. The duplication of fixed costs incurred in a duopoly structure may be socially justified in a static model by three effects: the sampling effect, the yardstick competition effect, and the increasing marginal cost effect.
We show that in general, asymmetric information favors duopoly when the market structure is decided before firms discovers their cost characteristics (a common situation in dual sourcing for procurement), and favors monopoly when the market structure is decided after firms discover their cost characteristics (the case of split-award auctions).  相似文献   
64.
TOURISM, TRADE AND DOMESTIC WELFARE   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Abstract.  Tourism has been regarded as a major source of economic growth and a source of foreign exchange. It has also been viewed as an activity that imposes costs on the host country. Such costs include increased pollution, congestion and despoliation of fragile environments, and intra-generational inequity aggravation. One aspect that has been ignored is the general equilibrium effects of tourism on other sectors in the economy. This paper presents a model that captures the interdependence between tourism and the rest of the economy, in particular agriculture and manufacturing. An important result obtained is that the tourist boom may 'immiserize' the residents.  相似文献   
65.
After 20 years of neglect by international donors, agriculture is now again in the headlines because high food prices are increasing food insecurity and poverty. In the coming years, it will be essential to increase food productivity and production in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and with smallholders. This, however, requires finding viable solutions to a number of complex technical, institutional, and policy issues, including land markets, research on seeds and inputs, agricultural extension, credit, rural infrastructure, connection to markets, rural non-farm employment, trade policy and food price stabilization. This paper reviews what the economic literature has to say on these topics. It discusses in turn the role played by agriculture in the development process and the interactions between agriculture and other economic sectors, the determinants of the Green Revolution and the foundations of agricultural growth, issues of income diversification by farmers, approaches to rural development, and issues of international trade policy and food security, which have been at the root of the crisis in agricultural commodity volatility in recent years.  相似文献   
66.
We explain the firm downsizing trend of the recent decades by the new abundance of information – the ICT revolution. Production processes differ in their information requirements: while decentralized production by means of market exchanges is information intensive, less information per unit of output is needed in the hierarchically integrated production of firms, and the information/output ratio is decreasing firm size.

We formulate a quantity of information theory of the firm embodying these differences and derive a Coase–Rybczinski effect for the aggregate economy, which predicts a decreasing employment share of large firms and an increasing share of small ones when the aggregate quantity of information increases Panel data regressions and other evidence provide support for this hypothesis.  相似文献   

67.
We suggest, in a Coase-Demsetz perspective, that the social demand for individual rights??or freedoms (whether civil, political or economic)??is derived from, because complementary to, the changing size of hierarchical organizations. The general downsizing and decentralization process observed worldwide after 1975 is itself the result of the information revolution and the resulting abundance of information. It follows that social demand for freedoms depends in turn??and inversely??on the cost of information (and thus on market imperfection) as well as on traditional determinants such as the distribution of resources and human capital. This implies that freedoms are adopted, implemented, or ??produced?? by various political regimes according to an objectively observable and contingent determinant. We believe this approach can shed light on the reason for the waxing and waning of freedoms in modern history.  相似文献   
68.
69.
In this paper we first generalize the Dorfman-Steiner theorem to the case of an oligopoly with multiple competitive reactions and expansible industry demand. We then review the literature through a series of corollaries. On the basis of the theorem developed, we attempt to shed light on a oligopolistic market over a period characterized by the raise of a leader.  相似文献   
70.
How difficult is it and by what means is it possible to control a self-managed firm that has some monopoly power? To answer this question, classical modeling options are adopted: static framework, maximization by the firm of value added per capita. Three assumptions are added: perfect information on technologies by the Center, availability of unlimited lump-sum transfers and linear excise taxes, and market clearing. Attention is thus restricted to allocational problems, ruling out concern for distribution and regulation.  相似文献   
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