Regions of the Production Function,Returns, and Economies of Scale: Further Considerations

Contrasting their work with that of Christopher Ross Bell, the authors present a graphical isoquant analysis that suggests that it is not possible for a production function characterized by decreasing returns to yield economies of scale.     

Price-Fixing and Shareholder Returns: An Empirical Study

This paper examines the market reaction to three different events related to allegations of price-fixing: the initial charges, the firm's plea, and the resolution of the case. Negative, risk-adjusted shareholder returns are associated with the initial charge of price-fixing, while mixed results are observed during the two days immediately after the plea. The ultimate resolution of the case appears to be anticipated by the market. The overall decline in shareholder wealth from all three events combined is about 5 percent. These results suggest that shareholders are at least partial beneficiaries of price-fixing and that the presumption of an agency problem may be incorrect.     

The Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-evaluation

A bstract . A 1982 study of the efficacy and impact of tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) is updated. Utilizing various statistical comparisons, growth in expenditures and revenues in states with TELs is compared to growth in states without a TEL in place. This comparison matches growth in the pre tax revolt years with growth in the post revolt years. In all cases the statistical tests show that the existence of a TEL has had virtually no impact on the growth of statewide expenditures or revenues. Additionally, while aggregate state expenditures and revenues exhibited some decline during the tax revolt years, this decline was short-lived and has since been reversed. Thus, the primary implication is that TELs as presently construed are an ineffective means of limiting growth in state budgets     

Trend/cycle decomposition of regime-switching processes

We present a new approach to trend/cycle decomposition of time series that follow regime-switching processes. The proposed approach, which we label the “regime-dependent steady-state” (RDSS) decomposition, is motivated as the appropriate generalization of the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition [Beveridge, S., Nelson, C.R., 1981. A new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 7, 151–174] to the setting where the reduced-form dynamics of a given series can be captured by a regime-switching forecasting model. For processes in which the underlying trend component follows a random walk with possibly regime-switching drift, the RDSS decomposition is optimal in a minimum mean-squared-error sense and is more broadly applicable than directly employing an Unobserved Components model.     

PRODUCTIVE RECESSIONS AND JOBLESS RECOVERIES

We explore international variation in business cycle dynamics to gain insights into the recent pattern of robust productivity growth during downturns (productive recessions) and weak employment growth during recoveries (jobless recoveries) seen in some advanced economies. We find that sectoral change is associated with productive recessions but that labor market rigidity can impede reallocation and reduce the probability of a productive recession. We also find evidence of a link between productive recessions and jobless recoveries and that recessions dominated by reductions to employment, rather than changes in average employee hours, are more likely to be associated with jobless recoveries. (JELF44, E32)     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.