Business Ethics: Law As A Determinant of Business Conduct

The Principles of Corporate Governance require that business conduct conform to the law. In recent years, news reports of business misconduct have cast doubt on a conclusion that conformity is the prevalent practice. This article explores the influence of law on business conduct by comparing the law’s requirements and purposes with actual business conduct in the market. Specifically, it explores whether certain legal regimes are more effective than others in inducing greater commitment to legal compliance by corporate actors. The conclusion drawn is that the prevalent legal regime – a vague common law or legislative mandate – is typically associated with corporate conduct that evades or ignores the law’s mandate or its underlying purpose. Vincent Di Lorenzo is Professor of Law; Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center for Church and Society, St. John's University; J.D. Columbia University (Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar); Associate Articles Editor, Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems. Before joining the faculty at St. John's University School of Law, Professor Di Lorenzo was a member of the faculty at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and was associated with a major Wall Street firm practicing in the real estate-banking department. He is a member of the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association. Professor Di Lorenzo has authored many articles and books in the banking, legislation and real estate areas.     

越俎代庖的美联储

在过去几周里，美国联邦储备委员会（Fed）基本上是重新定义了央行应在市场经济中扮演的角色。     

Trend/cycle decomposition of regime-switching processes

We present a new approach to trend/cycle decomposition of time series that follow regime-switching processes. The proposed approach, which we label the “regime-dependent steady-state” (RDSS) decomposition, is motivated as the appropriate generalization of the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition [Beveridge, S., Nelson, C.R., 1981. A new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 7, 151–174] to the setting where the reduced-form dynamics of a given series can be captured by a regime-switching forecasting model. For processes in which the underlying trend component follows a random walk with possibly regime-switching drift, the RDSS decomposition is optimal in a minimum mean-squared-error sense and is more broadly applicable than directly employing an Unobserved Components model.     

Practicing effective knowledge sharing in international hotel joint ventures

Knowledge sharing can be described as the process by which individuals mutually exchange their knowledge and collaboratively generate new knowledge. Since international hotel joint venture partners typically possess skills in competing areas, this process of knowledge sharing is critical to the success of these alliances. Therefore, this article presents a framework that can be used to foster effective knowledge sharing at the individual joint venture manager level, at the relationship level between individuals, and across the entire organization.     

PRODUCTIVE RECESSIONS AND JOBLESS RECOVERIES

We explore international variation in business cycle dynamics to gain insights into the recent pattern of robust productivity growth during downturns (productive recessions) and weak employment growth during recoveries (jobless recoveries) seen in some advanced economies. We find that sectoral change is associated with productive recessions but that labor market rigidity can impede reallocation and reduce the probability of a productive recession. We also find evidence of a link between productive recessions and jobless recoveries and that recessions dominated by reductions to employment, rather than changes in average employee hours, are more likely to be associated with jobless recoveries. (JELF44, E32)     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.     

The Regressive Recovery: Distribution,Inequality and State Power in Britain's Post-Crisis Political Economy

This article interrogates the underlying mechanisms at the heart of Britain's post-crisis political economy. We argue that the contemporary economic recovery has been characterised by a dynamic of ‘regressive redistribution’: a socially regressive dynamic of state-led economic restructuring that has worked through two axes at the centre of the recovery. The first axis, a monetary policy framework centred upon Quantitative Easing, has driven asset-price inflation to the benefit of the wealthiest asset holders. The second axis centres upon the politics of regressive labour market restructuring which has provoked widespread wage deflation. In combination, these two axes have been central to defining the contours of the Britain's post-crisis political economy paradigm: characterised by rising asset wealth for the few, and falling living standards alongside increasing economic insecurity for wage earners. The opportunity to change path from the trends of deepening inequality that defined the pre-crisis era has not been taken. Instead, the prevailing policy paradigm of the post-crisis period – discursively unified and sustained by David Cameron's government – has intensified the regressively redistributive dynamics at the core of the neo-liberal project. Ultimately, this is likely to further entrench structural weaknesses in Britain's economy in the years ahead.     

STRUCTURAL HOMOPHILY

Homophily, or the fact that similar individuals tend to interact with each other, is a prominent feature of economic and social networks. I show that the equilibrium structure of homophily has empirical power. I build a strategic model of network formation, which produces a unique equilibrium network. Individuals have homophilic preferences and face capacity constraints on the number of links. I develop a novel empirical method, based on the shape of the equilibrium network, which allows for the identification and estimation of the underlying homophilic preferences. I apply this new methodology to the formation of friendship networks.