Interest Rate Feedback Rules in an Open Economy with Forward Looking Inflation

With the adoption of an explicit inflation target in the UK, there has been renewed interest in the properties of alternative interest rate feedback rules. Following Svensson (1999) a literature examining the relative merits of inflation and price level targeting has also developed. In this paper we compare the stabilization properties of the two forms of feedback rule that have been used most frequently in the literature and which give rise to price level and inflation targeting, respectively. The model in which we embed our rules is significantly richer than those considered in the price level targeting literature and this allows us to explain why the relative performance of the rules is dependent upon the nature of the shock considered and whether or not excess inflation is defined in terms of consumer or output price inflation.     

Fiscal Stabilization Policy and Fiscal Institutions

In this paper we analyse counter-cyclical fiscal policy withinthe context of a microfounded analysis of business-cycle stabilization.We show that tax and spending instruments can have a usefulcounter-cyclical role, even after allowing for the distortionarynature of the instruments and the need for debt sustainability.A critical barrier to the use of fiscal instruments may be politicaleconomy concerns, and we survey recent suggestions involvingalternative fiscal policy institutions. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: c.b.leith{at}socsci.gla.ac.uk; s.wren-lewis{at}exeter.ac.uk     

COPENHAGEN,CANCÚN AND THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

The rise of a global welfare economics directed at the environmental challenges facing our planet represents a new policy phenomenon. This paper examines the most ambitious attempt so far to put such economics into practice via the Kyoto Protocol and more specifically the Clean Development Mechanism of the Protocol. The Copenhagen and Cancún climate change conferences have put an end to hopes of the Protocol serving as an effective tool in the mitigation of global warming. This failure of the new global welfare economics is the result of flawed principles, not just defective implementation.     

Political Entrepreneurs and the Transfer Demanding Process: Homesteading the Unassigned District

This paper introduces the transfer-demanding entrepreneur to help bridge the gap between static equilibria in an interest group theory of government and process theories. The transfer demanding entrepreneur acts in a creative, discontinuous fashion to organize latent demand for a particular transfer into an effective interest group. The disequilibrating, re-equilibrating transfer demanding entrepreneur provides a theoretical framework for understanding the movement between static political equilibria. This paper considers the transfer demanding entrepreneurship necessary to bring together the western railroads, organized labor, and potential Oklahoma colonists in the passage of white settlement and coal-lease ratification legislation in the Indian Territory.     

Persistence and Change at the Top of the IT Sector

We use the DATAMATION index of the top 50 domestic IT companies (1975–1995) to track persistence and change at the top of the sector. The trends that we uncover are increasing instability, rejuvenation (declining average age of entrants coupled with increasing average age of quitters), democratization (diminishing revenue inequality at the top) and growing supply‐side intertwining of sub‐sectors and industries within IT due to diversification by long‐term survivors.     

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997     

Hunting the Whale: More Evidence on State Government Leviathans

Caplan holds that governments are Leviathans, seeking to extend their power by increasing government expenditures beyond the level preferred by voters. We extend Caplan's model by examining the real (percentage) growth rates of government. We also examine whether government size increases at an increasing rate as the minority party weakens. We find evidence that supports and fails to support the original Leviathan hypothesis. We also fail to support our extensions of Caplan's hypothesis. Furthermore, our significant and contrary results have intuitively appealing interpretations. From these results, we conclude that the impact of political party power on government spending is ambiguous.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Sociality and money1

This is a translation of ‘Socialité et argent’, a text by Emmanuel Levinas originally published in 1987. Levinas describes the emergence of money out of interhuman relations of exchange and the social relations – sociality – that result. While elsewhere he has presented sociality as ‘nonindifference to alterity’ it appears here as ‘proximity of the stranger’ and points to the tension between an economic system based on money and the basic human disposition to respond to the face of the other person. Money both encodes and effaces sociality, both designates and disguises social relations. It arises from the way that needs and interests are manifested in exchange relations, in what he calls the ‘interestedness’ of economic life. But interests are always already cut through by the fact that being is always ‘being with others’. Being is always ‘interbeing’. Interestedness is always confronted by disinterestedness, that is, by a sociality marked by the ‘goodness of giving’, attachment to and concern for the poverty of the other person. Levinas concludes with a discussion of sociality and justice, posing questions about the tension between the demand to respond to an Other immediately before me and at the same time to respond to the demands of an other Other (the third person) who also invites a response.