Information sharing as a safeguard against the opportunistic behavior of South African Karoo Lamb farmers

Misconduct in global meat supply chains are omnipresent and even more so in differentiated chains where credence attributes such as origin and taste are used to differentiate the product. By definition, these attributes signal asymmetric information which implies that in the presence of bounded rational individuals with conflicting interests, misconduct in the form of opportunistic behavior is bound to prevail. Increased information exchange through farmer networks is, however, expected to reduce opportunistic behavior. In the case of a differentiated meat product, such as Karoo Lamb, the article studies the farmer‐abattoir transaction with the purpose of recommending strategies that can be implemented to reduce the farmer's tendency to behave opportunistically. The article employs the PLS approach to SEM and reveals a significant negative relationship between information shared and opportunistic behavior. The results indicate significant positive relationships between trust in the abattoir and information shared as well as between farmer networks and information shared. These results are indicative of the support provided to the information shared construct by higher levels of trust between farmers and abattoirs and established farmer networks. It is, therefore, recommended that differentiated meat supply chains, through their various associations, concentrate their efforts to promote information sharing by building stronger, trust centered relationships and by supporting farmer networks.     

Solidarische Privatversicherung oder Bürgerprivatversicherung? Eine Replik

In der Juniausgabe ver?ffentlichte der Wirtschaftsdienst einen Aufsatz mit dem Titel „Die Solidarische Privatversicherung — Ein Vorschlag zur Gesundheitsstrukturreform“. Dieses Konzept diskutieren Johann Eekhoff und Christine Wolfgramm und stellen dem einen eigenen Vorschlag entgegen. Ulrich van Suntum erl?utert seine Sichtweise in einer Erwiderung.     

Ideenwettbewerbe als innovatives Markenbindungsinstrument

Onlinebasierte Ideenwettbewerbe mit Web 2.0-Funktionalit?ten bieten neue innovative M?glichkeiten im Online Marketing. Sie tragen dazu bei, die Bekanntheit und positive Wahrnehmung einer Marke in der ?ffentlichkeit zu st?rken. Konsumenten setzen sich intensiver mit einer Marke auseinander, was schlie?lich zu einer st?rkeren Identifikation mit der Marke und Bindung führt. Auch Swarovski, dem Kristall-Weltmarktführer, gelang durch diese Einbindung von Konsumenten der Erfolg.     

Triggers for virtual customer integration in the development of medical equipment — From a manufacturer and a user's perspective

Virtual customer integration (VCI) involves customers throughout all stages of the new product development process. Firms across industries have started to experiment with virtual user integration and expect to utilize their knowledge, creativity, and judgment. However, little research exists that looks at the motivations of customers and managers to engage in virtual product development projects. In this paper we try to identify the triggers for virtual customer integration (VCI) from the manager's as well as from the customer's perspective. Using Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior we aim at explaining managers' motivation for the adoption of VCI based on a sample of 104 managers engaged in the product development process of manufacturing firms of medical technology. Drawing on motive research, we test six categories of customer motivations to engage in VCI projects on a sample of 105 users of medical technology. The results show that for mangers subjective norms and attitude predict the intention to use VCI. For customers, interest in innovation and product improvement are the most important drivers, whereas monetary compensation and prestige are not significant, and surprisingly the desire to help people even has a negative impact on the participation of VCI.     

Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voter's future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

An Empirical Approach

There is empirical evidence that investors' confidence is not only adversely affected by corruption but also by the lack of predictability and confidence that accompanies corrupt deals. However, the positive aspect of this lack of confidence is that it acts as a deterrent to corruption. Empirical data provided here on a cross–section of countries proves that confidence in corrupt deals enhances the further spread of corruption. This suggests that the adverse effects of corruption cannot be avoided by divesting it of its unpredictability.