The influence of variables of attitude on collective entrepreneurship

In the current global corporate climate that surrounds us, firms would do well to encourage the talent and creativity of their employees in order to achieve success. This is achieved, not by giving priority to individual talent, but by optimizing the collective as a whole and the firm’s activity based on team work and joint effort. Heads of organizations might benefit from creating a favorable context for the birth and growth of collective internal cooperation, which is understood to be the collective ability to create and innovate on the part of the team, the firm or the organization. Having contrasted our hypotheses through research on Spanish firms, we have concluded that job satisfaction and commitment to the team are factors that have a direct and positive effect on collective entrepreneurship.     

The relationship between performance appraisal criterion specificity and statistical evidence of discrimination

Plaintiffs' expert witnesses in EEO cases involving performance appraisals often claim that adverse impact is a result of the type of rating format used. Their theory is that more specific rating criteria will lead to lessened adverse impact. We tested that theory by comparing data from a simple category‐based rating system against data from a standards‐based Work Planning and Review appraisal system with over 248,000 performance appraisals of state employees. Using logistic regression and statistical definitions of prima facie discrimination, we found no support for the hypothesis that adverse impact is materially affected by criterion specificity. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Are Sunk Costs a Barrier to Entry?

The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry—if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incurs greater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the entrant to stay in the market. By providing the entrant with commitment power, sunk investments may soften the reactions of incumbents. The net effect may imply that entry is more profitable when sunk costs are greater.     

A Citation-Based Ranking of Strategic Management Journals

Rankings of strategy journals are important for authors, readers, and promotion and tenure committees. We present several rankings, based either on the number of articles that cited the journal or the per article impact. Our analyses cover various periods between 1991 and 2006, for most of which the Strategic Management Journal was in first place and Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (JEMS) second, although JEMS ranked first in certain instances. Long Range Planning and Technology Analysis & Strategic Management also achieve a top position. Strategic Organization makes an impressive entry and achieves a top position in 2003–2006.     

Der Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre — insbesondere Rechnungswesen und Controlling — der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität,Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Rater Bias and Incentive Provision

The tendency of supervisors to judge an employee as either good or bad and then to seek out evidence supporting that earlier established opinion is regarded as one of the major problems of performance appraisal. We investigate the implications of this rater bias in a dynamic moral hazard model with a wealth‐constrained agent. Although rater bias weakens the agent's incentives to exert effort in late periods, at the same time it strengthens implicit incentives in early periods. Under the optimal contract, as long as rater bias is not overly strong, its adverse effect on late‐period incentives is fully offset by exploitation of stronger early‐period incentives and thereby leaves the principal's profits unchanged.     

Three Corrected Score Tests for Generalized Linear Models with Dispersion Covariates

We develop three corrected score tests for generalized linear models with dispersion covariates, thus generalizing the results of Cordeiro , Ferrari and Paula (1993) and Cribari-Neto and Ferrari (1995) . We present, in matrix notation, general formulae for the coefficients which define the corrected statistics. The formulae only require simple operations on matrices and can be used to obtain analytically closed-form corrections for score test statistics in a variety of special generalized linear models with dispersion covariates. They also have advantages for numerical purposes since our formulae are readily computable using a language supporting numerical linear algebra. Two examples, namely, iid sampling without covariates on the mean or dispersion parameter oand one-way classification models, are given. We also present some simulations where the three corrected tests perform better than the usual score test, the likelihood ratio test and its Bartlett corrected version. Finally, we present a numerical example for a data set discussed by Simonoff and Tsai (1994) .