The effect of general counsel prominence on the pricing of audit services

We investigate the effect of corporate general counsel (GC) ascension to the senior management team on the pricing of audit services. Prior research suggests that the GC position may have a significant influence in setting the tone at the top by promoting corporate integrity, ethics, and serving as a governance and monitoring mechanism, but also recognizes that prominent GCs may face ethical dilemmas, causing them to disregard professional responsibilities to curry the favor of the CEO and other executives. Using audit fees to proxy for audit engagement risk, we find a negative association between GC ascension to top management and audit fees. We investigate the mechanisms behind this relation and find GC ascension is associated with a reduction in both default risk and financial misstatement risk, which supports auditors’ perceived reduction in client business risk and audit risk, respectively.     

CEO internal experience and voluntary disclosure quality: Evidence from management forecasts

Internally‐promoted CEOs should have a deep understanding of their firm's products, supply chain, operations, business climate, corporate culture, and how to navigate among employees to get the information they need. Thus, we argue that internally‐promoted CEOs are likely to produce higher quality disclosure than outsider CEOs. Using a sample of US firms from the S&P1500 index from 2001 to 2011, we hand‐collect whether a CEO is hired from inside the firm and, if so, the number of years they worked at the firm before becoming CEO. We then examine whether managers with more internal experience issue higher quality disclosures and offer three main findings. First, CEOs with more internal experience are more likely to issue voluntary earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Second, CEOs with more internal experience issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those managers with less internal experience as well as those managers hired from outside the firm. Finally, investors react more strongly to forecasts issued by insider CEOs than to those issued by outsider CEOs. In additional analysis, we find no evidence that these results extend to mandatory reporting quality (i.e., accruals quality, restatements, or internal control weaknesses), perhaps because mandatory disclosure is subjected to heavy oversight by the board of directors, auditors, and regulators. Overall, our findings suggest that when managers have work experience with the firm prior to becoming the CEO, the firm's voluntary disclosure is of higher quality.     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.     

The relative influence of price and non-price factors on short-term retail deposit quantities?

This study explores how price and non-price factors influence change in the quantity of short-term retail deposits held by depository institutions. The analysis is undertaken for a sample of UK building societies over 23 years using a disaggregated data set with a two-stage econometric procedure involving system estimators in a panel framework using seemingly unrelated regression, generalised method of moments and an ordinary least-squares fixed effects estimators to control for contemporaneous correlation and endogeneity concerns. Price factors examined include the policy or base rate and retail deposit interest rates set by individual building societies and non-price factors including the branch network and the number of deposit accounts offered by individual building societies. The cost of funds, one non-price factor and occurrence of mergers are consistently significant influences of retail deposit quantities. We conclude risk assessment of retail deposit quantity and monetary policy transmission would benefit from considering both price and non-price factors, rather than only price factors.     

Implications of biased reporting: conservative and liberal accounting policies in oligopolies

We examine the effects of biased (conservative or liberal) reporting on product market competition. Cournot duopolists observe either firm-specific or industry-wide shocks and provide noisy reports subject to an exogenous mandated bias attributed to public policy. Given neutral prior beliefs, either a conservative bias or a liberal bias enhances overall reporting-system informativeness as measured by the reduction of uncertainty. Consistent with previously established effects in the information sharing literature regarding increases in informativeness, we show that expected industry profits and expected consumer surplus may gain or lose from bias, depending on whether the shocks are firm-specific or industry-wide and the degree of product competition. Expected social welfare, however, always increases in bias, irrespective of the source of uncertainty and product substitutability or complementarity. We next consider a setting where firms self-select whether to bias reports and characterize regions of potential conflict with a public policy that maximizes expected social welfare. Further results on the differential effects of conservative or liberal bias follow from relaxing the assumption of neutral prior beliefs.     

Errors and questionable judgments in analysts’ DCF models

We investigate the number of and reasons for errors and questionable judgments that sell-side equity analysts make in constructing and executing discounted cash flow (DCF) equity valuation models. For a sample of 120 DCF models detailed in reports issued by U.S. brokers in 2012 and 2013, we estimate that analysts make a median of three theory-related and/or execution errors and four questionable economic judgments per DCF. Recalculating analysts’ DCFs after correcting for major errors changes analysts’ mean valuations and target prices by between ?2 and 14 % per error. Based on face-to-face interviews with analysts and those who oversee them, we conclude that analysts’ DCF modeling behavior is semi-sophisticated in the sense that analysts genuinely make mistakes regarding certain aspects of correctly valuing equity but also respond rationally to the incentives they face, particularly the reality that they are not directly compensated for being textbook DCF correct.     

Consumption-based equity valuation

Using a CCAPM-based risk-adjustment model, we perform yearly valuations of a large sample of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over a 30-year period. The model differs from standard valuation models in the sense that it adjusts forecasted residual income for risk in the numerator rather than through a risk-adjusted cost of equity in the denominator. The risk adjustments are derived based on assumptions about the time-series properties of residual income returns and aggregate consumption rather than on historical stock returns. We compare the performance of the model with several implementations of standard valuation models, both in terms of median absolute valuation errors (MAVE) and in terms of excess returns on simple investment strategies based on the differences between model and market prices. The CCAPM-based valuation model yields a significantly lower MAVE than the best performing standard valuation model. Both types of models can identify investment strategies with subsequent excess returns. The CCAPM-based valuation model yields time-series of realized hedge returns with more and higher positive returns and fewer and less negative returns compared with the time-series of realized hedge returns based on the best performing standard valuation model for holding periods from 1 to 5 years. In a statistical test of 1-year-ahead excess return predictability based on the models’ implied pricing errors, the CCAPM-based valuation model is selected as the better model. Using the standard series of aggregate consumption and the nominal price index, a reasonable level of relative risk aversion, and calibrated growth rates in the continuing value at each valuation date, the CCAPM-based valuation model produces small risk adjustments to forecasted residual income and low continuing values. Compared with standard valuation models, it relies less on estimated parameters and speculative elements when aggregating residual earnings forecasts into a valuation.     

The Government Transformation Programme of Malaysia: a successful approach to public service reform

The 2009 Malaysian Government Transformation Programme (GTP) could be useful as a model for reform given its positive impact on improving public services in targeted key result areas. This paper assesses the GTP's approach in the context of the wider debate on whether reforms should be based on best practices or whether they should be diagnostic or problem-solving in approach. The GTP's success was largely the result of blending both approaches. The GTP experience in Malaysia provides a number of insights and lessons for delivering intelligent reforms quickly and effectively.     

How safe are the safe haven assets?

The aim of this paper is to examine which of the assets commonly believed to be safe havens do, in fact, protect investors during periods of severe financial instability. Using a broad dataset of 32 assets over the period of 1964–2014, we examine the relationship of these assets with the US equity market during financial crises to determine which of them are safe havens for US investors, hedges, or speculations. We find that the US Treasuries and Japanese yen are the strongest safe haven investments in months characterized by large declines in market value or excessive volatility. We also document that the recent global financial crisis had significantly negative ramifications on the safe haven properties of many of these assets. Our out-of-sample analyses show that while, in general, predictive market exposures are negatively correlated with asset returns in strong market downturns, those of even the strongest safe haven assets are often statistically insignificant.     

Professionalising British central government bureaucracy c. 1850: The accounting dimension

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) recommended fundamental changes to public policy which included the replacement of patronage by examination as the basis for recruitment to the British Civil Service and of seniority by merit as the foundation for promotion decisions. This paper examines the accounting dimension of reforms designed to achieve enhanced administrative efficiency and greater economy in the operation of government departments. A growing interest in the role of accounting within British government during the second quarter of the nineteenth century is elucidated, and prevailing ideas concerning how accounting within government departments and accountability from the executive to parliament might be performed more efficiently and effectively are uncovered. The battle between divergent pressure groups concerning who should possess jurisdiction over accounting work is explored, and the solution to this problematic is found to connect with the nature of a central government accounting system that was itself undergoing significant change. Consistency between the Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations and ongoing internal initiatives designed to ensure the competence of clerks recruited to undertake accounting work and subsequently applying for promotion to a higher grade is demonstrated.