Interfirm Bundled Discounts as a Collusive Device

This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand‐specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.     

Why Architecture Does Not Matter: On the Fallacy of Sustainability Balanced Scorecards

This study focuses on CEO hubris and its detrimental effect on corporate financial performance along with an examination of critical corporate governance contingencies (CEO power and board vigilance) that may moderate the negative effect. From 654 observations of 164 Korean firms over the years 2001–2008, we found that CEO power exacerbated the negative effect of CEO hubris on corporate financial performance, whereas board vigilance mitigated it. This study provides empirical evidence that entrenchment problems arising from CEO hubris would be exacerbated as CEOs become more powerful, but weakened as board of directors become more vigilant. Theoretical contributions and practical implications will be discussed.     

Modeling price transmission between farm and retail prices: a soft switches approach

Vector error correction models (VECM) are used to model price transmission when farm and retail prices are cointegrated. To allow for nonlinearity in the cointegration process, researchers may specify thresholds to break the error correction process into regimes according to whether the retail price is above, below, or close to its equilibrium value given farm prices.  However, because the coefficients in a VECM can change when there is movement from one regime to another, the model can be discontinuous.  This implies sudden, “hard” regime changes. In this study, we extend the threshold VECM to include features of smooth transition autoregression (STAR) models. Our approach allows for gradual, soft regime changes.  An empirical application to retail cheese and farm milk prices is presented.     

Effects of tempo and familiarity of background music on message processing in TV advertising: A resource‐matching perspective

This article examines effects of tempo and familiarity of background music in TV advertising. Based on the resource‐matching rationale stating that processing of a message is maximized when the resources demanded by the processing task match those people are able to make available, the authors predict an inverted‐U‐shaped relationship between the tempo and message recall. The prediction is fully supported when familiar music is used, but not when unfamiliar music is used in the background. Possible explanations of the results are offered and their implications are discussed. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important.     

The Effects of Negative Incidents in Sustainability Reporting on Investors’ Judgments–an Experimental Study of Third‐party Versus Self‐disclosure in the Realm of Sustainable Development

This study examines how the disclosure of negative sustainability‐related incidents affects the investment‐related judgments of decision‐makers. Participants in a sequential 2 × 2 between‐subjects experiment first received a company's financial information before viewing additional sustainability information (by the company and by a non‐governmental organization (NGO); with and without negative disclosure). Results indicate that self‐reporting of negative incidents does not affect decision‐makers’ stock price estimates and investment decisions compared with judgments based on financial information only. However, third‐party disclosure of these incidents by a NGO has a negative affect on these investment‐related judgments. Furthermore, the magnitude of the NGO reporting effect depends on whether the company itself simultaneously reports these incidents. Thus, disclosing negative incidents in sustainability reporting could lose some of its apparent stigma. Instead of avoiding negative reporting altogether, managers might use it as a risk mitigation tool in their reporting strategy. The results also emphasize the power of the often‐mentioned ‘watchdog’ function of NGOs acting as stakeholder advocates. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Resources and governance in “base of the pyramid”-partnerships: Assessing collaborations between businesses and non-business actors

Identifying, building, and maintaining partnerships with non-business actors are crucial challenges for multinational companies (MNCs) when implementing Base of the Pyramid (BoP) projects. Using a multiple-case study we analyze such partnerships through the lens of the relational view, focusing on resources generating inter-organizational value and on mechanisms for governing the partnerships. The cross-case analysis suggests that proficiency in identifying appropriate partners featuring non-tangible synergy-sensitive resources is vital for BoP ventures. MNCs compensate for their lack of local knowledge, contacts, and legitimacy by recruiting non-business actors for this consultancy and brokering function. Once a suitable network of partners has been identified, these resources need to be explored and exploited by developing personal relationships, communication routines, common goals, and partner-specific capacity building. Synergy-sensitive resources facilitate performance and long-term maintenance of BoP partnerships by establishing well-adapted and well-informed management practice and by creating a lock-in that works as an informal self-enforcing governance mechanism.     

Why Are People Honest? Internal and External Motivations to Report Honestly

We create and validate measures capturing internal and external motivations to report honestly as trait-like characteristics. Both measures have high levels of reliability, as well as convergent and divergent validity. To test their predictive validity, we conduct two experiments. In the first experiment, MTurk participants have the opportunity and incentive to misreport with no immediate consequences, and in the second experiment, participants with management experience report how they would make a hypothetical accounting allocation decision. In both experiments, we find that participants who are higher in internal motivations to report honestly are more likely to report honestly than those lower in internal motivations, confirming this measure's predictive validity. Both experiments also provide limited support for the predictive validity of our external measure, finding that those who are higher in external motivation do not report differently than those who are lower in external motivations in the absence of controls. Our study also reveals that individuals who are higher in internal motivations have a diminished reaction to different management controls: MTurk participants to a control that punishes misreporting, and manager participants to a control that rewards honest reporting. Results suggest that management and those charged with governance should consider that some employees can react negatively to controls that are perceived as constraining. Our measures are useful to researchers who investigate honest reporting by allowing them to identify, ex ante, individuals who want to be honest versus wanting to appear honest.