Piecewise linear incentive scheme and participative budgeting

This paper studies the economic incentives of participative budgeting through the design of incentive schemes within the agency theory framework. In particular, a piecewise linear incentive scheme (PLIS), an optimal version of Weitzman's New Soviet Incentive Scheme (NSIS), is derived. The characteristics of PLIS are: first, unlike NSIS, the bonus (penalty) rates of the optimal PLIS vary according to the agent's type in order to improve the principal's welfare, second, a penalty may be imposed on the overfulfillment of the agent's performance in order to maintain incentive compatibility, and finally, it is shown that if the coefficients are constant as in NSIS, there is no need for participative budgeting. Also, PLIS is compared with a quadratic incentive scheme. Both incentive schemes achieve the optimal solution, but each incentive scheme has its own advantage over the other depending on the situation.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Archetyping relationships with companion animals to understand disaster risk-taking propensity

Pets factor into the daily decision-making of many people. Importantly, various characteristics of these human–animal relationships are known to strongly influence pet owners’ risk behaviour and, consequently, their animals’ welfare during disasters. Yet, few studies have examined a range of such characteristics concurrently in order to describe risk propensity differences in these relationships. In this study, 437 Australian companion-animal (pet) owners reported human–animal relational, personality and attitudinal characteristics, to examine differences in stated tendency to act to secure their pet’s welfare whilst risking potential harm in a hypothetical disaster dilemma. Cluster analysis identified five archetypal profiles differing in relational, personality, attitude and risk-propensity characteristics, as well as in stated willingness to risk personal safety for the well-being of a pet. Results suggest that relational archetypes are an effective means of examining pet–owner risk propensity, to better understand owners’ risk-taking to protect their animals from harm during a disaster.     

Macro Prudential Supervision in the Open Economy,and the Role of Central Banks in Emerging Markets

In this paper we explore lessons from the global liquidity crisis pertaining to the prudential supervision role of central bank in an open economy. The crisis validates the need for external debt management policy in emerging markets. Hoarding international reserves (IR) is a potent self-insurance mechanism. However, it is associated with relatively high costs and is also less efficient in absence of assertive external debt management policies. In the presence of congestion externalities associated with deleveraging, optimal external borrowing-tax-cum-IR-hoarding-subsidy reduces the cost as well as the scale of hoarding IR.     

A Technological and Organisational Explanation for the Size Distribution of Firms

This paper combines insights from the literature on the economics of organisation with traditional models of market structure to construct a theory of equilibrium firm size heterogeneity under the assumption of a homogenous product industry. It is possible that configurations consisting entirely of small firms (run by entrepreneurs with limited attention) and with larger firms (using managerial techniques to substitute away these limits to allow increasing returns technologies to become profitable) can arise in equilibrium. However, there also exist equilibrium configurations with the co-existence of large and small firms. The efficiency properties of these respective equilibria are discussed. Finally, the implications of an expanding market size are considered.     

Optimal wage re-negotiation in a closed and open economy

This paper investigates an economy in which there are short-term wage contracts that are re-negotiated under certain conditions. The paper determines the optimal frequency of wage re-negotiation and shows that it depends positively on measures of aggregate variability and Phillips curve slope. The role of optimal wage re-negotiation is to mitigate the output effects of various shocks. In the context of an open economy, it is shown that the desirable exchange rate regime in an economy with optimal wage re-negotiation depends on the stochastic structure of the economy.     

Basic human needs: The plateau curve

The satisfaction of basic human needs in developing countries follows a nonlinear curve relative to per capita income, asymptotically approaching a limiting level. Within this general relationship, some countries are more ‘efficient’ than others in improving basic needs at lower per capita income levels. Infant mortality rates in 116 countries, from 1950 to 1980, are analyzed to identify factors affecting a country's efficiency in reaching infant mortality targets relative to its Gross Domestic Product per capita. The determinants of efficiency include export structure, internal distribution, late development and access to education. Implications for development policy are discussed.     

Effects of Mentoring on the Development of Leadership Self‐Efficacy and Political Skill

This study of 260 business graduate students considered the relationship between mentoring and leadership self‐efficacy, and mentoring and political skill. Comparisons between nonmentored and mentored individuals showed that having a mentor was associated with increased political skill but not with increased leadership self‐efficacy. Among mentees, higher quality mentoring relationships were associated with significantly higher leadership self‐efficacy but not with significantly higher political skill. Results suggest that the presence of a mentor affects protégé development of political skill, but the quality of the relationship is important for protégé development of leadership self‐efficacy.