Strategy–organization configurations in corporate venture units: Impact on performance and survival

We develop a typology of corporate venture units, based on their strategic role in the corporation, and specifically on (a) their relative emphasis on exploration versus exploitation and (b) the internal versus external locus of opportunity they pursue. Following configurations logic, we argue that the structures and systems used by venture units will be a function of their strategic role, and that their performance will be higher when internal elements are aligned. We also argue that exploitation-oriented units will survive for longer than exploration-oriented units. Using primary data collected on 95 venture units during 2001–2003, we use configurational analyses to test and find support for our hypotheses.     

COVID-19 and pro-sociality: How do donors respond to local pandemic severity,increased salience,and media coverage?

Experimental Economics - Has the COVID-19 pandemic affected pro-sociality among individuals? After the onset of the pandemic, many charitable appeals were updated to include a reference to...     

The ties that bind: geopolitical motivations for economic integration

Review of World Economics - Economic determinants of economic integration agreements have received ample attention in the economic literature. Political motivations for such agreements have been...     

Opacity in bargaining over public good provision

We consider ultimatum bargaining over the provision of a public good. Offer-maker and responder can delegate their decisions to agents whose actual decision rules are opaque. We show that the responder will benefit from strategic opacity, even with bilateral delegation. The incomplete information created by strategic opacity choices does not lead to inefficient negotiation failure in equilibrium. Inefficiencies arise from an inefficient provision level. While an agreement will always be reached, the public good provision will fall short of the socially desirable level. Compared with unilateral delegation, bilateral delegation is never worse from a welfare perspective.