Self-selection and the power of incentive schemes: an experimental study

We examine how self-selection of workers depends on the power of incentive schemes and how it affects team performance if the power of the incentive schemes is increased. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, subjects who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between their efforts and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high.     

Dynamic Effects of Sponsoring: How Sponsorship Awareness Develops Over Time

This study takes a longitudinal perspective to investigate sponsorship awareness in a multiple-year, international context pertaining to the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League, a prestigious European soccer competition for club teams with worldwide exposure. A logit model aims to predict sponsorship awareness for one of the main sponsors of the league using data pertaining to more than 25,000 consumers from five countries, over the period 2005 to 2009. The findings provide an empirical argument for building long-term relationships. Sponsorship awareness levels increase over the measurement period, and the highest increase occurs in the second year of sponsorship.