Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investor, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or non-existent, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger.     

Efficiency of the OLSE for regressions on two-dimensional grids with sinusoidal regressors and spatially correlated errors

For spatial regressions with sinusoidal surfaces, the ordinary least squares estimator (OLSE) is shown to be asymptotically as efficient as the generalized least squares estimator (GLSE) in that the covariance matrices of the two estimators have the same nontrivial limit under the same normalization.     

Disappearing internal capital markets: Evidence from diversified business groups in Korea

This paper examines how the onset of a financial crisis affects the operation of internal capital markets among firms within a diversified business group. We find that active internal capital markets within Korean business groups (chaebols) attenuate the financial constraints of the group-affiliated firms, allowing them to make efficient capital allocations during the early 1990s. However, these markets barely function after the financial crisis of 1997. Instead, we observe public debt markets serving as a substitute for internal capital markets. Our results suggest that chaebol firms’ coordinated attempts to achieve healthier financial structures in the wake of the crisis have taken place at the expense of investment efficiency.     

Affective and continuance commitment and their relations with deviant workplace behaviors in Korea

This study examined the nature of the relations between affective and continuance components of organizational commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991, Human Resource Management Review, 1: 61–89) and deviant workplace behaviors (DWB; Bennett & Robinson, 2003) in a sample of 120 Korean employees and their supervisors. As expected, we found that affective commitment was negatively related, and continuance commitment was positively, albeit modestly, related to supervisor ratings of DWB. Implications for the theory and practice are discussed.     

Residents' Perceptions of the Impact of Cultural Tourism on Urban Development: The Case of Gwangju,Korea

Cultural tourism constitutes an alternative strategy of sustainable urban development for improving quality of life. The main objective of this type of tourism is to transform regions characterized by cultural resources into ideal places for vacation, residence or business. In this study residents' perceptions of cultural tourism were examined in a case study of Gwangju, Korea. It was found that the majority of the respondents were aware of the importance of cultural tourism and that they argued that it could contribute to urban development. The findings also suggest that there is a strong relationship between the respondents' characteristics and their perceptions of the impact of cultural tourism on urban development.     

Optimal Exit Costs of Foreign Direct Investment

This paper examines the optimal policy on exit costs of foreign direct investment for a host country considering the impact of varying income level and host country’s risk aversion against volatile FDI flows. Based on a dynamic model about the impact of the exit costs on FDI inflows and capital formation, we demonstrate that a host country should determine the exit cost considering two counterbalancing factors, that is, facilitating higher FDI inflows and reducing volatility of FDI inflows. When a host country is less vulnerable to volatility with inelastic risk aversion against FDI volatility, it is optimal for the host country with a negative income shock to take a more aggressive approach to induce FDI inflows by lowering exit costs. However, if the host country is more vulnerable to volatility with elastic risk aversion, the host country is advised to take a conservative approach by increasing exit costs to reduce FDI volatility. These findings, supported by the OECD data on 42 countries’ exits costs, implicate that developing countries are recommended to lower exit costs to induce higher FDI inflows when they are not highly vulnerable to volatility shocks.     

Executive Bonus Target Ratcheting: Evidence from the New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules

This study investigates whether firms revise executive bonus compensation targets based on past performance. Studies in this area suffer from a lack of detailed information related to executive performance targets. Using mandatory disclosures of executive compensation information under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's new disclosure rules, this study provides the first large‐sample evidence of bonus target ratcheting. There are three major findings: (i) executive bonus targets ratchet and they ratchet asymmetrically; (ii) the degree of target ratcheting and ratcheting asymmetry vary with executive equity incentives and investment opportunities; and (iii) performance relative to bonus target is serially correlated.     

How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.