A componovation perspective of innovation in emerging markets: Evidence from Indian organizations

In todays market landscape firms can effectively compete without the benefit of resource advantages, proprietary technology, or market power but by being more aligned towards creative combination and responsive innovation. This study approaches the concept of componovation from the composition based view (CBV) developed by Luo and Child. The CBV emphasizes how firms with ordinary resource endowments can achieve outstanding results through the creative use of open resources and unique integrating capabilities that result in an enhanced speed and a value‐price ratio that are well suited to large numbers of mass market consumers. Thus componovation is a new approach aimed at innovation in emerging markets.     

PEER TRANSPARENCY IN TEAMS: DOES IT HELP OR HINDER INCENTIVES?*

In a joint project involving two players of a two‐round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other’s efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency eliminates the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players’ efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.     

Examining Sustainability of Federal Finances in India: An Application of Non-Stationary Panel Methods

This paper examines the fiscal sustainability of Indian States during the 1990s on the basis of their budgetary data. Sustainability has been discussed using the inter-temporal budget constraint framework and has been tested by applying the panel co-integration technique. The panel analysis reveals that revenue receipts and revenue expenditures are co-integrated across the States. Further, the insensitivity of the results to the choice of the period of analysis attests robustness to the result that the State finances in India may not be unsustainable.

     

Are Indian States Converging in the Post-Reform Period?: An Empirical Inquiry

This paper studies the convergence phenomenon for 23 states of India for the period 1981 to 2001. The decades of the 1980s and the 1990s has been studied separately to comment on the convergence behaviour in the pre reform and post reform period. In addition to that of per capita SDP, convergence of per capita output emanating from the agriculture, industry and the services sector has been analysed to get a deeper insight. Both sigma (σ) convergence and beta (β) convergence have been examined. The study finds absence of sigma (σ) convergence and unconditional beta (β) convergence of per capita NSDP both in the 1980s and 1990s. However, conditional beta (β) convergence estimates reveal that the poorer states are catching up with their richer counterparts in the 1990s. The panel GMM estimates reveal that Indian states converged to their steady state output at a higher rate in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. At the sectoral level, Industry had a higher speed of convergence than agriculture in both decades. Further, divergence rather than convergence is observed for the services sector in both decades.

     

Unraveling in first-price auction

In a private values first-price auction with random number of bidders, the auctioneer has to decide whether to announce or not the actual number of bidders. If the auctioneer cannot commit to any particular announcement policy, then he would like to reveal when the number of bidders is high in order to increase bidding competition. By the same logic, the auctioneer should like to conceal if the number turns out to be small. When bidders' types are independent, full revelation by the auctioneer is shown to be a unique equilibrium with ‘skeptical belief’ as the unique equilibrium belief.     

Group size paradox and public goods

In an economy with voluntarily provided public goods and private product varieties, and a general class of CES preferences, it is shown that aggregate public good contribution follows an inverted-U pattern with respect to group size when private and public goods are substitutable in preferences. With complementarity, however, aggregate provision grows monotonically with group size.     

Trade liberalization,wilful credit defaults and bank bribery in a credit-constrained economy

The rising incidence of credit defaults may cause credit crunch. This affects the ability of firms to finance working capital and also fixed capital formation. Naturally, this is a major macroeconomic shock. This paper is an attempt to address the microeconomic foundation of such macroeconomic shock. We provide a theoretical framework to explain the economic rationale behind ‘wilful corporate defaults’ and ‘financial corruption’ in the specific context of trade liberalization. First, we model the behavioural aspects of wilful corporate defaulters and bank officials to determine the bank bribe rate as an outcome of the Nash bargaining process in a two-stage sequential move game. Based on the results of the partial equilibrium framework, we examine aspects of trade liberalization in an otherwise 2 × 2 general equilibrium framework. We also compare the efficacy of punishment strategies to economic incentives to deter credit defaults and banking sector corruption. Methodologically, our analytical model integrates finance capital distinctly from physical capital in Jonesian general equilibrium framework. Interestingly, our findings indicate that there exists a trade-off at equilibrium between curbing credit defaults and bribery. We also find that not all punishment strategies are equally effective at deterring credit defaults if general equilibrium interlinkage effects are carefully dealt with.