Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the ‘protection for sale’ model?

Abstract.  In the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous trade protection, sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare. We empirically investigate this model using U.S. and Turkish data. Our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies. Additionally, we assume all specific‐factor owners to be organized into different lobbies. These changes, validated by hypothesis tests, yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government's concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies.     

Does a free media protect labour rights?

Based on a sample of 47 developing economies considered over the period 1992–2012, we find that a free media reduces the legal protection of labour, taken as a whole. However, the impact differs over various aspects of labour regulation: while media freedom correlates with less stringent regulation of work time, less constraints to dismissal, and lower protection of employee representation rights, it also correlates with greater legal parity of part-time and fixed-term labour with full-time and permanent workers.     

Gender Bias in Education in West Bengal

This paper attempts to capture gender bias at two different levels of education, namely, below class-10 and above class-10 using NSSO 64th round education expenditure data on West Bengal. The analysis for the below class-10 level involves an intra household framework and Heckman’s two step model. Further, for this section the analysis is split up into classes 1–8 and classes 9–10 in view of the Right to Education act (2005). For above class-10 level, gender bias has been captured through a multinomial logit model for selection of subjects across households.

     

Implications of Nash Bargaining for Horizontal Industry Integration

This article shows how horizontal industry integration can arise from transferable asymmetry of technologies and endowments. The Nash bargaining solution suggests that greater technological diversity among coordinating parties yields greater gains from horizontal integration. The framework fits the case where a firm with a superior technology franchises the technology by horizontal integration. The results appear to fit hog production where integration has been primarily horizontal and, in part, broiler production where integration has been both vertical and horizontal. Specifically, technology has been shared through uniform genetic traits, fine-tuned feed rations, and veterinary services specified in grower contracts.     

Investigating the distribution of personal income obtained from the recent U.S. data

This study considered the conservation of money in a closed economic system. In such system, the probability distribution of money is exponential, and similar to the Boltzmann-Gibbs function in a closed energy system. The theoretical concept of econophysics is compared here with empirical data. The current work analyzes the recent data with regard to personal income distribution obtained from United States Census Bureau for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. The data was best fitted with the exponential function, which supports the theoretical assumption for the income of the majority of the population. This study also investigates this distribution for a population with high personal income.     

The Effects of Individual Difference Factors on the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace Behaviors

The purpose of this paper was to determine whether the individual attributes of locus of control, gender, major in college and years of job experience affect the acceptability of certain workplace behaviors. A total of 198 college students of a mid-sized southeastern university formed the sample for this study. Locus of control, gender and years of job experience were found to have some affect on whether an individual considered a certain behavior acceptable or unacceptable.     

TAX-PRICE REFORM WITH DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE PROFIT-SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES*

This paper explores the extent to which insights available from existing writings on directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities in international trade modify rules of tax and tariff reform in normative public economics and examines in what way these should affect advice on tax policy usually given to developing countries. The analysis proceeds by developing two models. The first incorporates revenue seeking directly into a standard open economy public finance model and examines whether analysis of policy reform and economic costs of distortionary tariffs must be modified. The second includes a political component in the form of lobbying for subsidies – the expenditure side of the budget – as well as a normative economic component that raises taxes – the revenue side – to finance the social costs of such lobbying. The model can be used to determine the effects of politically determined expenditures on tax setting. The analysis shows that the grammar of welfare-theoretic arguments that underlies the reform and design of tax and tariff structures is robust to the inclusion of DUP activities of the type considered here. In particular, the latter lend no presumption in favor of uniformity in tax and tariff structures. It is argued that existing policy advice on tax and tariff reform derived from models where DUP activities have traditionally played no role continues to be appropriate when account is taken of formal treatments of DUP-type phenomena extant in the current literature.     

Periodic and chaotic programs of optimal intertemporal allocation in an aggregative model with wealth effects

Summary We examine a discrete-time aggregative model of discounted dynamic optimization where the felicity function depends on both consumption and capital stock. The need for studying such models has been stressed in the theory of optimal growth and also in the economics of natural resources. We identify conditions under which the optimal program is monotone. In our framework, the optimal program can exhibit cyclic behavior for all discount factors close to one. We also present an example to show that our model can exhibit optimal behavior which is chaotic in both topological and ergodic senses.We would like to thank V. Bala, J. Benhabib, P. Dasgupta, R. Day, L. W. McKenzie, K. Nishimura, S. Roy, and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Research support from the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.