The Effects of Individual Difference Factors on the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace Behaviors

The purpose of this paper was to determine whether the individual attributes of locus of control, gender, major in college and years of job experience affect the acceptability of certain workplace behaviors. A total of 198 college students of a mid-sized southeastern university formed the sample for this study. Locus of control, gender and years of job experience were found to have some affect on whether an individual considered a certain behavior acceptable or unacceptable.     

TAX-PRICE REFORM WITH DIRECTLY UNPRODUCTIVE PROFIT-SEEKING (DUP) ACTIVITIES*

This paper explores the extent to which insights available from existing writings on directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities in international trade modify rules of tax and tariff reform in normative public economics and examines in what way these should affect advice on tax policy usually given to developing countries. The analysis proceeds by developing two models. The first incorporates revenue seeking directly into a standard open economy public finance model and examines whether analysis of policy reform and economic costs of distortionary tariffs must be modified. The second includes a political component in the form of lobbying for subsidies – the expenditure side of the budget – as well as a normative economic component that raises taxes – the revenue side – to finance the social costs of such lobbying. The model can be used to determine the effects of politically determined expenditures on tax setting. The analysis shows that the grammar of welfare-theoretic arguments that underlies the reform and design of tax and tariff structures is robust to the inclusion of DUP activities of the type considered here. In particular, the latter lend no presumption in favor of uniformity in tax and tariff structures. It is argued that existing policy advice on tax and tariff reform derived from models where DUP activities have traditionally played no role continues to be appropriate when account is taken of formal treatments of DUP-type phenomena extant in the current literature.     

Sensitivity of optimal programs with respect to changes in target stocks: The case of irreversible investment

Consider an aggregative model of economic growth with changing technology and tastes, in which investment is irreversible. It is shown that initial decisions in finite-horizon optimal programs are insensitive to changes in terminal stocks, provided the horizon is long enough. This generalizes Brock's result, which was proved assuming investment to be reversible. The irreversibility constraint does not allow one to follow Brock's method of proof, using the dual (Shadow Price) properties of optimal programs. An alternative method of proof is developed, using a primal approach, and exploiting dynamic programming arguments.     

Exchange Rate Risk and Commodity Trade Between the U.S. and India

Floating exchange rates are said to introduce volatility into the foreign exchange market that could deter trade flows. Previous research employed aggregate import and export trade data and provided mixed results. In this paper we disaggregate the trade data between the U.S. and the emerging economy of India and use the bounds testing approach to cointegration and error-correction modeling to show that in 40 industries that trade between the two countries, exchange rate volatility has negative and positive effects in 40% of industries, in the short run. These short-run effects, however, do not last into the long run in many cases.

Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Utility-based green electricity programs provide market opportunities for consumers to reduce the carbon footprint of their electricity use. These programs deploy three types of public-goods contribution mechanisms: voluntary contribution, green tariff, and all-or-nothing green tariff (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). We extend the theoretical understanding of the all-or-nothing green tariff mechanism by showing that an assumption of warm-glow preferences is needed to explain widespread participation in programs deploying this mechanism. We conduct the first experimental test to compare the revenue generating capacity of a pure public good (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) and an impure public good (based on the green tariff mechanism). In experimental play, the voluntary contribution mechanism raises 50% more revenue than the green tariff mechanism. With the all-or-nothing green tariff, experimental play and regression estimates show that a warm-glow preference positively affects participation, as predicted by the theory.     

Extinction in common property resource models: an analytically tractable example

We discuss an analytically tractable discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a renewable resource. We characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the resource does not become extinct in equilibrium. This condition requires that the intrinsic growth rate of the resource exceeds a certain threshold value that depends on the number of players and on their time-preference rates.