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131.
Kazuhiko Kato 《Journal of Economics》2013,110(2):165-180
We determine the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly when the environmental problem exists. With regard to the ownership of the private firms, we analyze two cases: (h) the private firm is owned by domestic private investors and (f) it is owned by foreign private investors. A comparison of the two cases presents the following results. Partial privatization is always desirable in (h), and the optimal degree of privatization is independent of the degree of environmental damage. However, in (f), whether partial privatization is desirable or not depends on the degree of environmental damage: there are cases where full privatization or full nationalization is optimal. 相似文献
132.
133.
Tetsuo Yamamori Kazuhiko Kato Toshiji Kawagoe Akihiko Matsui 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):336-343
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’
anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before
the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In
particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases.
Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
134.
Experimental Economics - An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash... 相似文献