Product innovation with mass-production: Insufficient or excessive?

Significant product innovation often entails standardization of product characteristics and mass-production. This paper examines the market outcome and social-welfare property of product innovation involving mass-production. It is shown that the share of mass-producers has tendency to be larger than the social optimum. The equilibrium share of mass-produced products is determined by the indifference condition of the marginal customer, while the optimal share is based on the indifference condition of the average customer. Since the marginal customer's benefit of using local products is lower than the average customer's, consumers move to mass-produced products more than desired. However, if there is positive externality among consumers in using mass-produced products, the market may have multiple equilibrium and the conclusion of excessive share of mass-produced products in market equilibrium may be reversed.     

Interlinkage in the endogenous real business cycles of international economies

Summary This study investigates interlinkage among the business cycles of countries from the viewpoint of endogenous real business cycles. For this purpose, we build a simple perfect foresight equilibrium model with two countries and characterize the global dynamics of a free-trade equilibrium as well as that of each country's autarky equilibrium by means of the fundamental structure of an economy.We are greatful to Murray Kemp, Mukul Majumdar, Takashi Negishi, Marcus Noland, Ian Novos, Jose Scheinkman and an anonymous referee for useful conversations and suggestions.     

Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games

Experimental Economics - An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash...     

Taxing multinationals: The scope for enforcement cooperation

Policymakers seeking to raise more tax revenues from multinational enterprises have two alternatives: to raise tax rates or to devote more resources to improve tax compliance. Tougher tax enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments (the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement). In line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, we analyze the scope for enforcement cooperation among asymmetric countries, considering that taxes are set noncooperatively. We show that the low-tax country may fail to cooperate if asymmetry is large enough and that tax havens would never agree to cooperate. Then we identify two drivers for enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is the complementarity of enforcement actions across countries. This is because the efficiency loss from enforcement dispersion is greater under complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership by the high-tax country, which acts as a level-playing field in the tax competition and reduces the extent of disagreement on enforcement.     

Japanese Banks’ monitoring activities and the performance of borrower firms: 1981–1996

We construct an index measure that quantitatively describes the monitoring activities of Japanese banks. Using micro data on Japanese banks and borrower firms, we examine the effects of bank monitoring on the profitability of borrower firms. We find significant positive effects in the periods 1986–1991 and 1992–1996, although there is no significant effect in the period 1981–1985. We also examine how banks’ monitoring affects borrowers. The results show that the positive effects of banks’ monitoring on borrowers’ profitability are mostly caused by screening effects, not performance-improving effects.

A note on the global stability in dynamical economic systems

A simple set of sufficient conditions is given for utility functions to satisfy the Q-matrix condition of Brock and Scheinkman. Utility functions must be sufficiently concave but not excessively concave compared with the discount rate.     

Ergodic chaos in optimal growth models with low discount rates

Summary We show that for every discount factor(0,1) one can find infinitely many strictly concave discrete-time optimal growth models in reduced form which have optimal policy functions exhibiting ergodic chaos. These reduced form models are interpreted in a two-sector optimal growth setting with utility functions depending on consumption as well as on capital.We thank Luigi Montrucchio for pointing out an error in a previous version of the paper.     

Proxy contests and corporate democracy

A proxy contest is a fight between two management teams to gain proxies from shareholders.The management team which accumulates a majority of votes wins the competition for corpo rate control. This paper attempts to construct a formal model of proxy contests and analyze their implications for the shareholders’ benefit and power of control over the firm.