健脑俱乐部悄然兴起

现年63岁的作家琳达·巴克林（Linda Hale Bucklin）看见自己所在的社区新开了一家“健脑俱乐部”，当场办了张卡。现在，她每周去那里三次，通过电脑学习一个“视觉处理”课程，她觉得这个课程帮助她更快地找到汽车钥匙，并提高了自己的网球技巧。     

Reinforcement versus balance response in sequential choice

Psychologists often explore the impact of one act on a subsequent related act. With an eye to the marketing literature, this paper explores two properties of sequential choices that involve the resolution of competing goals. Reinforcement occurs when the goals driving the first choice are made stronger by that choice and result in a congruent subsequent choice. Balance occurs when the first choice satisfies or extinguishes the goals that led to the original decision, producing an incongruent subsequent choice. This review examines a number of psychological frameworks that account for reinforcement or balance responses in sequential choice and identifies theoretically relevant moderating variables that lead to either response.     

Competitive Grants and the Funding of Agricultural Research in the United States

Efforts to improve public agricultural research efficiency include calls to increase use of competitive grants. This paper empirically assesses different instruments the USDA uses to fund state-level research. Compared with other instruments, competitive grants focus more on basic research and are concentrated among fewer states. Model results suggest that top-ranked biology and agricultural science programs were strong determinants of states' shares of competitive grants. Other significant factors were agricultural sector size and number of agricultural scientists. USDA-funded state-level research focus did not change significantly because competitive grants comprised only 15% of these funds and other instruments counteracted their influence.     

The President Versus the Senate: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve

For politicians, appointments are an instrument of policy influence.By installing their representatives in an institution, politicianscan count on policy influence for the duration of their appointees'terms. Given the stakes, the occasional controversy regardingnominees is understandable. On the whole, however, nominationsare not controversial; in fact, Senate confirmation votes areoften unanimous. Nevertheless, the Senate can have substantialinfluence in the appointment process. Using a formal model,this article examines how the president and Senate strategicallybargain with one another within the confines of the FederalReserve appointment process to influence monetary policy. Witha new way to estimate monetary policy preferences, this articleshows empirically that policy influence occurs via appointments.