Why is it so difficult to beat the random walk forecast of exchange rates?

Recent empirical evidence suggests that the time series behavior of the real exchange rate is well approximated by a nonlinear, exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) model. This nonlinearity helps resolve a number of puzzles concerning the persistence and volatility of real exchange rates. In this paper, we explore whether it may also help resolve the well-known difficulties of exchange rate forecasting. We develop a bootstrap test of the random walk hypothesis of the nominal exchange rate, given ESTAR real exchange rate dynamics. We find strong evidence of predictability at horizons of 2 to 3 years, but not at shorter horizons.     

Impacts of 2003 CAP reform on land rental prices and capitalization

Based on a graphical analysis, we investigate the impacts of the Fischler Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy on land rental prices and the capitalization of single farm payments (SFP) into land values. The model shows that the degree of capitalization mainly depends on the scarcity/surplus of SFP entitlements relative to eligible hectares, the implementation model (historical versus regional) and the land supply elasticity. If there are more SFP entitlements than eligible hectares, the degree of capitalization into land values may not decline and may even increase due to the inclusion of other supports such as animal premiums in the SFP. We test this hypothesis with an empirical analysis of cross-section data on land rental prices in Bavaria for 2005. Empirical results indicate that decoupled SFP are capitalized into rental prices to a larger degree than the coupled direct payments of the time prior to the reform.     

Oh my gosh,I got to get out of this place! A qualitative study of vicarious embarrassment in service encounters

Vicarious embarrassment is a negative emotion, which is experienced by an individual when others misbehave. People can feel vicariously embarrassed when observing other people's pratfalls or awkward appearance. For instance, vicarious embarrassment is elicited when watching reality TV or in service encounters where many other customers are present. However, the relevance of vicarious embarrassment in physical service environments has not yet been thoroughly analyzed in the context of service encounters. The objective of the present study is to close this research gap and to introduce the phenomenon of vicarious embarrassment to service research. The findings of 25 in‐depth interviews indicate that vicariously embarrassing incidents mostly occur in service encounters and that these incidents are triggered by the violation of social norms in both customer‐to‐customer and customer‐to‐employee interactions. The authors of the present paper identified closeness of relationship, the service context, and parties involved as important situational variables influencing vicarious embarrassment and further emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences for the observing person. From a managerial point of view, the relevance of vicarious embarrassment in physical service environments is caused by negative spillover effects of the service experience, which lead to decreasing customer satisfaction, negative word‐of‐mouth and purchase intentions, and a negative impact on the overall image of the service provider.     

Tradable planning permits for land-use control in Germany

In addition to a broad range of qualitative land development objectives, the German Federal Government has committed itself to reduce the growth of settlement and traffic areas from currently 113 ha (2004–2007) to 30 ha per day by 2020. In order to attain this ambitious quantitative goal, our paper presents a market-based policy of ‘tradable planning permits’. This system would control land development by fixing the total amount of open space loss in a period with allocated planning permits, which can be traded between local jurisdictions. Since this approach is based on the cap-and-trade principle, we evaluate the transfer of traditional emission trading concepts to land-use control and explore regulatory options of potential systems: an undifferentiated permit system, a trading-ratio system and variations of zonal permit systems. We subject these alternative approaches to critical evaluation by using a variety of important criteria including efficiency gains, ecological effectiveness, hot spot formation and transaction costs. Finally, we summarize the potentials, limitations and risks of a permit trading system in general while reflecting the ongoing German debate on open space preservation.     

Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default

The standard Principal–Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985, Econometrica53, 69–76) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is not permitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest rates, and default rates as functions of the level of bankruptcy protection level. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D80, G21, G28, J30.     

Supervision without regulation: Discount limits at the Austro–Hungarian Bank, 1909–13

We show that nineteenth century central banks could use credit limits for discount loans as a means to enforce supervisory standards long before they had any formal regulatory powers. Drawing on novel microdata from the Austro–Hungarian Bank's archives, we document that credit limits were continuously monitored and that their size was contingent on counterparties’ liquidity and capital position. Counterparties had an economic motive to abide by informal prudential ‘rules of the game’: higher credit limits enabled counterparties to streamline their day-to-day liquidity management. We exploit the heterogeneous exposure of counterparties to an exogenous liquidity shock to evidence that the Bank relaxed credit limits during crises to fulfil its role as a lender of last resort.