Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development: 100 years of development

This article sheds light on the impact of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development over the last 100?years, and identifies insights from that work that are less well-known, but that have the potential for informing current developments in evolutionary economics. We identify these insights by tracing the development of Schumpeter’s ideas in Theory of Economic Development, which he revised heavily between the first and second German and the English editions. We not only report material lost in the process and developments in Schumpeter’s thinking that can be read off of the revisions, but also indicate how the newfound material can inform and inspire evolutionary economics today.     

Are MMMFs money?

Conclusion In the last twenty years, continual financial innovation has led to the increased use of MMMFs as a substitute for checkable deposits. While many technical considerations suggest that it is inappropriate to list MMMFs as money, traditional Austrian thought has emphasized money’s subjective aspects: money is what people think it is. Since the public increasingly uses MMMFs as money substitutes, they are money in all practical respects. Every technical consideration that would restrict the use of MMMFs as a type of money thus crashes against the rocks of practical, everyday experience. While nonbank financial intermediaries can expand this type of money substitute, the Federal Reserve must still provide initial credit for any multiplication to take place. These nonbanks are even more difficult for the Fed to control, for they face no reserve requirements. But, on the other hand, there are more opportunities for leakage from the system, thereby limiting potential credit expansion. Nonetheless, this is an aspect of money that is becoming increasingly important. And if, as seems likely, MMMF expansion stimulates different sectors of the economy than the banking system generally, we should expect to see monetary inflation manifest itself in different ways than previous inflations. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author thanks Bryan Caplan for crucial insights on the topic as well as Pete Boettke and an anonymous referee for specific comments. As usual, all remaining mistakes are his.     

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium

Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D00, D40. Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support.