Does having one’s own place to live make someone more employable?

This article encapsulates the findings of a randomized correspondence test field experiment investigating whether job candidates’ home status influences their employability. More than 2000 employers with vacancies in the Swedish labour market received a job application from a fictitious candidate. A job candidate’s home status (his or her own place to live or temporary housing with a friend) was randomized across employers. Results show that home status indeed affected the number of positive employer responses received by job candidates, mainly in low-skilled occupations. Not having a place to live at the time of the application proved a disadvantage when applying for positions within but an advantage when applying for positions outside the city of residence at the time of the application.     

Concentration ratios,strategy and performance: The case of the Norwegian telecommunications industry

This article explores how changes in industry structure are reflected in changes in performance and strategy. A set of interrelated hypotheses is proposed and examined in one industry (the Norwegian telecommunications industry). Increasing competition was found to be positively related to increasing industry concentration but negatively related to new entries and performance as measured by value added. Large and small firms were found to vary in performance, and they are seemingly applying different strategies in coping with stagnating market opportunities.     

Observation of a strategic household purchase decision

The present paper focuses on strategic household purchase decisions; i.e., major, complex buying decisions with long-term bindings of economic resources. An in-depth study of house buying in two-career households demonstrated preferences (goals) to be ambiguous, and consequences to be modestly understood and partly uncovered after the purchase. Only a few alternatives were considered, and they were from different broad need-satisfying categories such as purchase of apartment or house, or renting. No direct comparisons of alternatives were observed to take place. The purchase decisions were based on few, very crude decision criteria working as guidelines for judging whether or not the alternatives considered were acceptable, while the final choice seemingly was made according to an affect-referral decision rule.     

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.     

Allowing disagreement in evaluations of social welfare

There is no consensus on how to measure interpersonally comparable, cardinal utility. Despite of this, people repeatedly make welfare evaluations in their everyday lives. However, people do not always agree on such evaluations, and this is one important reason for political disagreements. Thus, to keep in control of the normative premises, decision makers may prefer information which can be used as input to an arbitrary social welfare function to information which is the output from a social welfare function specified by the analyst. In this paper we try to identify and simplify sufficient welfare indicators; information which enables decision makers to arrive at welfare evaluations of social states or projects, according to their own ethical beliefs. Our conclusion is that providing factual information about different population groups, their social state, size, and characteristics, may be better for this purpose than the more traditional approach of focusing on ordinal utility information.     

Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies

The paper develops a theoretical rationale for a non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and government spending. A model is presented showing why and how political participation influences the spending behavior of opportunistic governments that can choose an optimal combination of rents and public goods to attract political support. If the level of democracy remains low, governments rationally prefer rents as an instrument to assure political support. With increasing democratic participation, however, rents become an increasingly expensive (per unit of political support) instrument while the provision of public goods becomes more and more efficient in ensuring the incumbent government's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy, which drives a country from a pure autocracy to a semi-participatory system, tends to reduce government spending, while an increase in political participation from a semi-participatory country to a full democracy tends to raise the size of the public sector.     

Benefit Transfer in Europe: How Reliable Are Transfers between Countries?

The benefits for specific health impacts related to air and water quality were measured in simultaneous contingent valuation surveys conducted in five different European countries. Consistent inter-country differences in willingness to pay to avoid ill health episodes could not be explained by measurable differences in individual characteristics. International transfer of unit values resulted in an average transfer error of 38%. Accounting for measurable differences among countries in health status, income and other demographic measures, either through ad hoc adjustments to the transferred values or through value function transfer, did not improve transfer performance.     

Enforcement and Information Strategies

In this paper we show that, if the relation between the actual monitoring probability and the extent of compliance in the regulated population is concave to the actual probability axis, providing perfect information raises compliance rates, relative to what might be called the “keep-them-ignorant” option. We also illustrate that a quite simple method is available for checking whether, in a particular setting with a particular class of regulated parties, the full information or the keep-them-ignorant policy ought to be pursued.