灾民生活重建支援对策的演进及存在的问题

本文以“灾民生活再建是灾后复兴的基础“为基本观点,就目前日本“灾民生活再建支援对策“的相关内容、意义、问题点等进行了探讨,并对如何推进未来“灾民生活再建支援对策“进行了展望。     

The regulations for indoor air pollution in Japan: a public health perspective

In recent years public health problems caused by indoor air pollution, known as ‘Sick Building Syndrome in housing’, or ‘Sick House Syndrome’ in Japan, have been drawing strong public concern. After conducting extensive exposure assessment, government authorities have taken effective measures to solve the problem. However, as a result of diversification and increase in quantities of industrial chemicals, existing regulations do not cover enough ranges of various potential hazardous chemicals. Hence, the regulations seek to be changed from hazard‐based regulation to a risk‐based one. Good indoor air quality (IAQ), which does not pose unacceptable health risks from all pollutants affecting indoor air, should be ensured for all public people. The objective of this study is to clarify the remaining issues to be solved urgently, related to the regulations to ensure a good IAQ. We reviewed enormous numbers of the existing governmental and industrial voluntary standards and/or guidelines, literature and documents concerning IAQ research in the past 40 years. Our results showed six subjects from those remaining issues. Based on these subjects we created a new scheme to control the IAQ; we especially regarded a comprehensive labeling system as one of the important strategies.     

Games of Fair Division

We consider the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible. Our primary normative concept is no-envy. First, we show that there is no non-manipulable selection from the no-envy solution. Then we study the direct revelation games associated with subsolutions of the no-envy solution. The set of equilibrium allocations of any one of them coincides with the set of envy-free allocations for the true preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D63, D7l, D82.     

Domestic distortions,imperfect information and the brain drain

An earlier paper by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) presented a theoretical analysis of the brain drain in the context of wage rigidity and unemployment. This paper extends the analysis by modifying the model to incorporate the phenomena of overqualification, internal diffusion of labor from urban to rural areas and imperfect information about the quality of labor. The welfare effect of the brain drain in the presence of these phenomena is analyzed.     

Consumer Risk‐reduction Behavior and New Product Purchases

Consumers purchase lower quantities of new products compared with those they have purchased in the past. We explain this observation as a result of risk‐averting behavior by utility‐maximizing consumers. If a new product involves a higher degree of risk that quality expectations will not be met compared with an incumbent product, we show that utility will be more concave for the new product. We test this prediction using a multiple‐discrete/continuous extreme value (MDCEV) model of demand. We show that utility is indeed more concave for new products relative to previously purchased products. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Quality Ladder and Product Variety: Larger Economies May Not Grow Faster

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model that combines the quality ladder model and the variety expansion model. Firms enter an imitation race. After the imitation process, monopolistic competition prevails and a new innovation race begins. A successful firm, by inventing a higher quality product, can take over the entire market. However, the existence of a variety of products limits the price that the successful firm can charge. We show that the present model exhibits an inverted U-shape relationship between market size and growth rate. Relatively large and small economies grow slowly while medium-sized economies grow rapidly.     

Signal-extracting education in an overlapping generations model

Summary. In order to get good positions in companies, people try to enter highly-ranked universities. However, abilities vary greatly between individuals. High-ability individuals have an incentive to send signals to firms by obtaining a higher level of education in order to distinguish themselves from low-ability individuals. This paper constructs an overlapping generations model in order to examine the macroeconomic consequences of such sorting behavior of individuals. There are two kinds of possible equilibria in our model. In one equilibrium, only the high-ability agent can obtain higher education and thus an elite society emerges. In the other equilibrium, all ability types have the chance to obtain higher education and thus a society with mass higher education emerges. We also discuss the possibility of multiple equilibria of these different steady states and the dynamic change in wage differentials.Received: 9 October 2002, Revised: 15 July 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D82, J31, O10.The authors acknowledge Osamu Hayashida, Noriyoshi Hemmi, Hideshi Itoh, Michihiro Kandori, Toshihiro Matsumura, Takuya Nakaizumi, Osamu Nishimura, Ryoji Ohdoi, Tadashi Yagi, Noriyuki Yanagawa, and seminar participants at Doshisha University, the University of Tokyo, and Contract Theory Workshop at Kyoto University for helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee for valuable comments. This paper is part of the academic Project on Intergenerational Equity (PIE), funded by a scientific grant from Japans Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (grant number 603).     

Efficiency and Lack of Commitment in an Overlapping Generations Model with Endowment Shocks

This paper considers a pure exchange stochastic overlapping generations model in which, on each date, an economy faces an aggregate endowment shock. On each date, a young agent and an old agent simultaneously decide how much of their respective endowments to transfer to the other agent; however, a young agent cannot make promises about how much he or she will give when old. In this sense, an economy faces a limited commitment constraint. This paper characterizes an efficient intergenerational risk sharing allocation that satisfies a limited commitment constraint, and also studies the role of money and history in a stochastic overlapping generations economy.