Can a Regional Trade Agreement Benefit a Nonmember Country without Compensating It?

RTAs are generally formed without any tariff concessions or transfers to nonmember countries. Can such an RTA benefit nonmembers' welfare? In a two‐good three‐country competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, an RTA without concessions to a nonmember will hurt nonmembers' welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepôt, however, it definitely improves nonmembers' welfare. In a three‐good three‐country model, an RTA without concessions damages the nonmember's welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.     

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model

In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length. We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite patent length does not maximize social welfare. Furthermore, we show that, in a growth model that does not exhibit scale effects, a finite patent length maximizes social welfare on the balanced growth path.     

Capital Flight, North-South Lending, and Stages of Economic Development

We present a two-country OLG economy in which international capital mobility exists in the presence of moral hazard in financial contracts. The difference in the extent of asymmetric information is a source of capital movement and capital flows from the South to the North. Even though there exists a unique steady state under autarky, multiple locally stable steady states may emerge in a world economy with an integrated capital market. However, the integration may drive the South down to further impoverishment. The South's government therefore should take into account seriously the timing of capital market liberalization as a conduit of economic development.     

A Random Parameter Model with Onsite Sampling for Recreation Site Choice: An Application to Southern California Shoreline Sportfishing

Estimation of consistent parameter estimates for recreational demand models faces challenges arising from the choice-based nature of the data collected primarily for resource management purposes. As an alternative to randomized respondent-based sampling, choice-based onsite sampling can provide information on actual choices made by a subset of the population where participation has a low incidence. While the literature has shown that under specific restrictions the estimation of choice models from onsite sampling data yields unbiased fixed parameter estimates for the conditional logit model, this result does not carry over to estimation of the random parameter logit model. We propose an estimator for the unbiased estimation of the random parameter model using choice-based data; our estimator uses weights based on information about the level of sampling effort. An empirical application of the standard and weighted discrete choice RUM models to onsite sample data on recreational fishing illustrates the advantages of the proposed estimator. The estimation results indicate the compensating variation associated with an decrease, or increase, of 50 % in expected catch rates for a recreational shoreline sportfishing trip to a man-made structure in southern California is $$-{\$}2.80$$ or $${\$}3.54$$ per trip, respectively.     

Commodity Taxation and Economic Growth

We construct a variety expansion growth model following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and incorporate various groups of goods into the model. Each group has its own elasticity of substitution. We seek to determine the goods on which the government should impose higher rates of commodity tax in order to raise a certain amount of tax revenue. We thus reconsider the Ramsey Rule (the Inverse Elasticity Rule) in a growing economy.     

THE NUMBER OF FIRMS AND THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

Incorporating home firms' lobbying in a country into a third market model of oligopoly, this paper studies how such lobbying affects the government's strategic export policy scheme. We pay special attention to the home firms' lobby formation and its effect on domestic welfare. The home firms can organize a lobby more easily when the number of their rival foreign firms is larger than that of them, and/or when the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. The strategic export policy under lobbying cannot improve the domestic welfare, which depends on the number of firms, the government's concern about political donation and the level of socially wasted lobbying costs.