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41.
This study estimates the impact of demographic change on energy use in two German regions, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Data from the EVS household survey are used to identify demographic characteristics and age-specific consumption patterns in the two regions. They are used in combination with regional household projections to construct consumption expenditure forecasts, which are then entered as demand impulses into regional input-out-put models to calculate sectoral production effects and energy use. The analysis shows that the impact of demographic change on energy use differs considerably between the two regions. Therefore, studies conducted at the national level may miss important effects, making it necessary to conduct more studies at the regional level.  相似文献   
42.
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 4 (1973) 295-300], Rashid [S. Rashid, Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: Asymptotic results, Econ. Letters 12 (1983) 7-10], Mas-Colell [A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem by Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ. 13 (1984) 201-206], Khan and Sun [M. Khan, Y. Sun, Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces, J. Math. Econ. 31 (1999) 455-492] and Podczeck [K. Podczeck, On purification of measure-valued maps, Econ. Theory 38 (2009) 399-418]. The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games.In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.  相似文献   
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Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers’ increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager’s private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst’s earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts’ expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.  相似文献   
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A broad class of generalized linear mixed models, e.g. variance components models for binary data, percentages or count data, will be introduced by incorporating additional random effects into the linear predictor of a generalized linear model structure. Parameters are estimated by a combination of quasi-likelihood and iterated MINQUE (minimum norm quadratic unbiased estimation), the latter being numerically equivalent to REML (restricted, or residual, maximum likelihood). First, conditional upon the additional random effects, observations on a working variable and weights are derived by quasi-likelihood, using iteratively re-weighted least squares. Second, a linear mixed model is fitted to the working variable, employing the weights for the residual error terms, by iterated MINQUE. The latter may be regarded as a least squares procedure applied to squared and product terms of error contrasts derived from the working variable. No full distributional assumptions are needed for estimation. The model may be fitted with standardly available software for weighted regression and REML.  相似文献   
47.
An estimation procedure will be presented for a class of threshold models for ordinal data. These models may include both fixed and random effects with associated components of variance on an underlying scale. The residual error distribution on the underlying scale may be rendered greater flexibility by introducing additional shape parameters, e.g. a kurtosis parameter or parameters to model heterogeneous residual variances as a function of factors and covariates. The estimation procedure is an extension of an iterative re-weighted restricted maximum likelihood procedure, originally developed for generalized linear mixed models. This procedure will be illustrated with a practical problem involving damage to potato tubers and with data from animal breeding and medical research from the literature.  相似文献   
48.
This article explores the implications of the European single currency within a simple sticky price intertemporal model. We focus on the question of how the euro may change the sensitivity of consumer prices in Europe to exchange‐rate changes. Our central conjecture is that the acceptance of the euro will lead European prices to become more insulated from exchange‐rate volatility. We find that this affects both the volatility and levels of macroeconomic aggregates in both the U.S. and Europe. We find that European welfare is enhanced, and the U.S. shares in Europe's good fortune.  相似文献   
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In a large class of product differentiation models á la Hotelling, the firms' payoffs in the game involving location in the differentiated products space exclusively depends on the distance to their neighbouring firms, rather than on the firms' locations proper. This leads to a degeneracy on the firms' strategy space. Using alternative equilibrium concepts, this is shown to be the reason for the non-existence of non-cooperative equilibria, especially if the firms' technologies are not identical.  相似文献   
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