The Rise and Demise of Defined Benefit Pension Plans

The Defined Benefit Pension Plan (DBPP), once regarded as the gold standard of traditional corporate pension plans, has fallen upon hard times. Corporate sponsors regard the plans as financial drains, fountains of bad publicity, and targets for heavy-handed government regulation. Employees covered by the plans fear they will not deliver on the promises employers made to provide financial security after retirement. Legislative fixes for the system have hastened, not slowed down, the exodus of employers from DBPP. The authors of this paper agree that DBPP is, indeed, an endangered species in the private sector, but concur with the criticism that the conventional explanations for it – particularly in the trade literature – tend be self-serving, superficial and not convincing and often incomplete in their analysis. Using Porter’s model of competition to identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing influences we endorse the conclusion that the failure of DBPP is one of strategic choice by employers whose power and influence in the global economy is not effectively counter-balanced by labor, or by forces sympathetic to labor. The growing trend towards the Defined Contribution Pension Plan (DCPP) is consonant with employers’ interests but a setback for employees who had to give up the “gold standard” (DBPP). Even the paradoxical effect of ERISA hastening the demise of the pension system it was created to reform is less puzzling when examined in the context of who had influence in drafting the legislation, writing regulations and enforcing the law.     

Corporate financing and anticipated credit rating changes

Firm circumstances change but rating agencies may not make timely revisions to their ratings, thereby increasing information asymmetry between firms and the market. We examine whether firms time the securities market before a credit rating agency publicly reveals its decision to change a firm’s credit rating. Using quarterly data, we show that firms adjust their financing structures before credit rating downgrades are publicly revealed. Specifically, firms on average increase their debt financing by 1.29 % before the disclosure of a rating downgrade, and this increase is due to the issuance of debt rather than the repurchase of equity. In contrast, firms do not take significant financing actions before credit rating upgrades.     

关于广州市酒店客房限价的探讨

针对广州交易会期间政府该不该对酒店客房实施限价所引起的争论，全面分析了实施限价的利弊，并通过调查酒店房价的实际情况，阐述政府放开酒店房价，是符合市场经济的行为，不会破坏广州会展业的发展。