Who Controls US?

Berle and Means asserted that US corporations typically have dispersed shareholders; their evidence did not support this conclusion. Today, 59.74% of US corporations have ‘controlling shareholders’ who hold at least 10% of the shares; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a family; 16.33% are controlled by a widely‐held financial institution; 13.55% are controlled through family trusts. In all size ranges, the USA has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all size ranges, it has a higher percentage of family‐controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies.     

浅谈建筑电气照明节能

照明系统是建筑电气中一大核心系统,同时也是一个大电能消耗单元,其节能是建筑电气节能中的一个重要组成部分。本文从照明系统耗能的常见原因分析入手,并对其节能原则与评价标准进行了概括性的分析与说明,在此基础上针对性地提出了建筑电气照明节能的具体措施。     

如何做好建设项目的内部审计

本文通过对建设项目内部审计的描述,阐述了在企业中对实施内部审计的意义和必要性;同时总结出了建设项目审计的手段和方法,给其他类似企业开展内部审计工作提供一定的借鉴意义。     

Location incentives in the low-income housing tax credit: Are qualified census tracts necessary?

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) is the largest project-based housing subsidy in the United States. Within the program, private developers receive a subsidy in exchange for constructing apartment units that rent for a predetermined affordable rate. Because the subsidy requires apartment buildings to charge a lower rental rate, the opportunity cost of developing subsidized housing in a location is the market rent that a developer could have charged if he had not received the subsidy. This study characterizes how profit incentives motivate location decisions within the LIHTC program by showing that opportunity cost causes more LIHTC development in locations with low market rent. This result implies that additional financial incentives, like the qualified census tract, may not be necessary to promote construction of subsidized housing in low-rent areas.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast

Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers’ increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager’s private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst’s earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts’ expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.     

创业拼凑、机会开发与新创企业创业绩效关系研究

对于新生弱小的新创企业而言,创业拼凑不仅仅是企业行为层面的被迫选择,更潜移默化地转变为企业战略层面的主动决策。在创业拼凑助力新创企业提升创业绩效的问题上,机会开发成为逻辑-行为-结果中关键的一环。从机会开发行为视角,探索创业拼凑决策逻辑对创业绩效的作用机理。实证结果发现,均衡型机会开发、创新型机会开发在创业拼凑与创业绩效的关系中分别存在部分中介效应,相比于创新型机会开发,创业拼凑与均衡型机会开发的匹配有利于获取更高的创业绩效。该研究对于新创企业决策逻辑形成和机会开发选择具有指导意义。     

成本控制概述

企业是微观经济的主体,其财务会计的最终目标是实现利润最大化、企业价值最大化。成本作为企业一定时期内生产特定种类和数量产品的资金耗费,是任何时代的任何企业都十分重视的一个问题,在走向市场经济的今天更是如此,所以本文主要对成本控制的涵义、内容和方法阐述了自己的一些看法。     

煤炭企业固定资产存在的问题及解决办法

煤炭业是我国国民经济中的支柱产业,经济社会可持续发展的基础,在经济社会中具有重要的作用,固定资产在煤炭企业中投入占矿井建设、生产投资比例也越来越大,怎样更好的管理和核算固定资产已成为煤炭企业当今不容忽视的问题。     

Examining the performance effects of post spin‐off links to parent firms: should the apron strings be cut?

Little research has examined the performance implications of the parent‐child relationship post spin‐off. Although the parent provided oversight of the child prior to the spin‐off, effects of post spin‐off links to the child remain unclear. Applying transaction cost and agency theories, our study of 142 firms spun‐off between 1986 and 1997 examines how oversight and ownership by the parent firm influence stock market performance post spin‐off. We find that while child firms benefit from some links to the parent, having too many links is negatively related to performance. The findings suggest that there is a balance between having too much parental involvement and not enough. Our study extends understanding of post spin‐off child firm performance and provides valuable insights for both parent and child firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.