Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.     

Why FX Risk Management Is Broken–and What Boards Need to Know to Fix It

This article provides a comprehensive critique of current corporate foreign exchange risk management (FXRM) practices. The authors characterize much of FXRM as a “legacy” activity, a set of outdated, often decentralized and “earnings‐driven” methods and procedures that have not been subjected to rigorous cost‐benefit analysis at the enterprise level. And according to the authors, the costs of poorly designed and executed FXRM have increased sharply in recent decades because of the growing demand by analysts and investors for cost‐efficiency, transparency, and predictability. After discussing six ways in which the FX policy of most large multinationals fails to serve the interests of their investors and other important stakeholders, the authors offer the following: (1) a restatement of the goals of FXRM; (2) an illustration of various ways of implementing a largely (if not completely) centralized approach to FXRM; (3) a proposal for aligning performance evaluation and executive pay with the goals of FXRM; (4) suggestions for improving decision‐support tools in relation to FXRM; (5) proposals for integrating FXRM into an enterprise‐wide risk management system, which include shifting responsibility for FXRM from the Finance/Treasury group to a centralized risk committee (typically under a Chief Risk Officer who reports to the board of directors); and (6) suggestions for improving communication of a company's risk management policies and practices to investors and other stakeholders.     

On the Limitations of Some Current Usages of the Gini Index

This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.     

A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions

In a recent paper Segerson (1988) proposed a novel incentive mechanism for stochastic non-point emissions based on ambient pollution concentrations in nature. For specification of the mechanism when the damage function is nonlinear, the regulator must know polluters cost and emission functions. The mechanism also gives incentives to form coalitions among polluters, which, if they are formed, render the mechanism inefficient. In this paper we propose a revised mechanism which eliminates the need for knowledge of polluters cost and emission functions and reduces the probability of coalition forming. A standards and pricing version of the revised mechanism with both properties mentioned is also developed.     

The market power of OPEC 1973–2001

We apply a multi-equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of OPEC as a whole or different sub-groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973–2001. Our results indicate that the producers outside OPEC can be described as competitive producers, taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits. The OPEC members do not fit the behaviour of price-taking producers. Our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for OPEC underpin the potential market power of the producer group, and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies. On the other hand, our findings indicate that neither OPEC nor different sub-groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973–1994. However, we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit OPEC-Core as from 1994. Thus, although OPEC clearly has affected the market price, the producer group has not behaved as a pure profit-maximizing dominant producer.     

Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants

In two-person bargaining over riskless outcomes where the outcome is chosen according to the Nash solution or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, an increase in a player's risk aversion is to the advantage of the opponent. It is shown in this note that for the n-person Nash solution, an increase in risk aversion is to the player's own disadvantage but needs not be advantageous to all the opponents. For the n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the increase is to the player's own disadvantage and to the advantage of all the opponents.     

Can Non-point Phosphorus Emissions from Agriculture be Regulated Efficiently Using Input-Output Taxes?

In many parts of Europe and North America, phosphorus loss from cultivated fields is threatening natural ecosystems. Though there are similarities to other non-point agricultural emissions like nitrogen that have been studied extensively, phosphorus is often characterized by the presence of large stocking capacities for phosphorus in farm soils and long time-lags between applications and emission. This makes it important to understand the dynamics of the phosphorus emission problem when designing regulatory systems. Using a model that reflects these dynamics, we evaluate alternative regulatory systems. Depending on the proportions of different types of farms in the agricultural sector, we find that an input-output tax system can be the core element of a close to efficient regulatory policy.     

Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals

A multinational firm sets the price that applies tointra-firm trade between the firm's affiliates at a central level,but delegates decisions about national prices (or quantities)to national affiliates. When these affiliates encounter competitionit is shown that delegation of authority and the nature of competitionchanges the role of the transfer price; it now becomes both atax saving and a strategic device. Comparative static resultsdevelop transfer pricing policies for affiliates encounteringCournot as well as Bertrand competition.