Engineering careers and technology transfer: Japanese companies in the UK

This article examines two issues: first how Japanese companies recruit, train and utilise engineers in their UK transplants; secondly, how technology transfer between British and Japanese engineers is affected by career structures. It draws on questionnaire responses from 88 companies and interviews at a small number of sites.     

Career paths, technological obsolescence and skill formation: R&D staff in Britain and Japan

This paper examines how scientists and engineers working in industrial R&D cope with the pressures of business and technological change and develop their careers. The data is drawn from a survey of nearly 1000 R&D staff working in large industrial corporations in Britain and Japan. Cross national comparisons are used to explore similarities and differences in coping strategies and in the human resource management challenges for companies. Particular attention is given to the problems of potential mismatch between RBD staff career orientations and available career opportunities.     

Who are Advisory Services Leaving Out? A Critical Reflection on ‘Hard to Reach’ Farmers

Although the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union has broadened its objectives to integrate social issues, several hard-to-reach groups of farmers and workers continue to be ignored by advisory services and associated policies. Connecting with these groups has a strong potential to increase the economic and social cohesion of European agricultures. We interviewed over 1,000 farmers across Europe and identified features of these groups that are often overlooked by advisory services. We critically reflected on the social cohorts omitted from advisory services and how they could be better reached; they include farm labourers, new entrants or ‘career changers’, and later adopters. We clarify the different types of advisors in the advisory landscape, distinguishing between those who are linked to or independent from sales of inputs or technologies. We make concrete recommendations about how to engage advisors with hard-to-reach groups, with approaches suited to different national contexts of Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems (AKIS); thus contributing to the ‘AKIS dimension of National Strategic Plans of the next Common Agricultural Policy, 2023–2027. We argue for the more effective use of advances in the social sciences through a better understanding of advice as social interaction which can bolster the inclusiveness of public policies.     

Too dynamic to fail: empirical support for an autocatalytic model of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis

Solomon and Golo (Account Econ Law 3(3):167–260, 2013) have recently proposed an autocatalytic (self-reinforcing) feedback model which couples a macroscopic system parameter (the interest rate), a microscopic parameter that measures the distribution of the states of the individual agents (the number of firms in financial difficulty) and a peer-to-peer network effect (contagion across supply chain financing). In this model, each financial agent is characterized by its resilience to the interest rate. Above a certain rate the interest due on the firm’s financial costs exceeds its earnings and the firm becomes susceptible to failure (ponzi). For the interest rate levels under a certain threshold level, the firm loans are smaller then its earnings and the firm becomes ‘hedge.’ In this paper, we fit the historical data (2002–2009) on interest rate data into our model, in order to predict the number of the ponzi firms. We compare the prediction with the data taken from a large panel of Italian firms over a period of 9 years. We then use trade credit linkages to discuss the connection between the ponzi density and the network percolation. We find that the ‘top-down’–‘bottom-up’ positive feedback loop accounts for most of the Minsky crisis accelerator dynamics. The peer-to-peer ponzi companies contagion becomes significant only in the last stage of the crisis when the ponzi density is above a critical value. Moreover the ponzi contagion is limited only to the companies that were not dynamic enough to substitute their distressed clients with new ones. In this respect the data support a view in which the success of the economy depends on substituting the static ‘supply-network’ picture with an interacting dynamic agents one.     

The Dollar-Pound Exchange Rate During the First Nine Months of World War II

Between August 25, 1939 and June 7, 1940, there was a free market for British pounds in New York. German success at the outset of World War II caused the value of free sterling to fall relative to the official exchange rate. This imposed an externality that made it more difficult for Britain to finance the war. Eventually, the externality became large enough that Britain chose to take extreme measures to abolish it, even at the expense of tarnishing the reputation of London’s financial markets. We collected daily data to investigate how the market reacted to war news and to policy changes. Using methods developed by Bai and Perron (Econometrica 66:47–78, 1998; Journal of Applied Econometrics 18:1–22, 2003), we find 17 breaks in the exchange rate. Fourteen are associated with military events and three are associated with policy changes. The episode illustrates how markets can fail to serve the public interest during times of war.