Estimation of market power in the presence of firm level inefficiencies

“The quiet life hypothesis” (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to management’s subjective cost of reaching optimal profits, firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is therefore likely to force management to work harder to reach optimal profits. Another hypothesis, which also relates market power to efficiency is “the efficient structure hypothesis” (ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies or technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to gain larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Ignoring the efficiency levels of the firms in a market power model might cause both estimation and interpretation problems. Unfortunately, the literature on market power measurement largely ignores this relationship. In the context of a dynamic setting, we estimate the market power of US airlines in two city-pairs by both allowing inefficiencies of the firms and not allowing inefficiencies of the firms. Using industry level cost data, we estimate the cost function parameters and time-varying efficiencies. An instrumental variables version of the square root Kalman filter is used to estimate time-varying conduct parameters.     

Politics and sustainable tourism development – Can they co-exist? Voices from North Cyprus

This paper investigates ways in which political obstacles inhibit the formulation and implementation of sustainable tourism development in small-island developing states through the example of North Cyprus. The methodology draws on in-depth interviews and participant observation of significant actors in the tourism sector. The research findings suggest that understanding the intricate political system and power structure in a society is the key to understanding sustainable tourism policy development, planning and implementation. In the case of North Cyprus, policy development was found to be a product of political influence (referred to as ego-driven politics in the text), specifically the use of public resources as an instrument for political power, retention and that the politicisation of the public sector is the underlying cause of the weakened progress in sustainable tourism development. It is therefore essential to have a clear understanding of political issues, key political actors’ interests and how to mitigate personal interests to facilitate and maintain sustainable tourism development in such small states.     

Is volatility risk priced in the securities market? Evidence from S&P 500 index options

The authors examine whether volatility risk is a priced risk factor in securities returns. Zero‐beta at‐the‐money straddle returns of the S&P 500 index are used to measure volatility risk. It is demonstrated that volatility risk captures time variation in the stochastic discount factor. The results suggest that straddle returns are important conditioning variables in asset pricing, and investors use straddle returns when forming their expectations about securities returns. One interesting finding is that different classes of firms react differently to volatility risk. For example, small firms and value firms have negative and significant volatility coefficients, whereas big firms and growth firms have positive and significant volatility coefficients during high‐volatility periods, indicating that investors see these latter firms as hedges against volatile states of the economy. Overall, these findings have important implications for portfolio formation, risk management, and hedging strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:617–642, 2007     

Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments

It is well known that signing publicly observable contracts with third parties is a means of credibly committing to certain actions and hence may yield strategic advantages. Previous work on the commitment value of unobservable contracts has been limited to normal form games and extensive form games in which only one party has the option to sign a contract. In this paper, we extend the analysis to extensive form games in which both players can sign contracts, and characterize the set of sequential equilibria. We show that any Nash equilibrium outcome of the original game in which both players receive more than their individually rational payoffs can be supported as a sequential equilibrium outcome. Therefore, delegation acts not only as a commitment device to gain advantage over the opponent, but also as a cooperative device to attain Pareto improvements over the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. I would like to thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Jean-Pierre Benoit, Alberto Bisin, Boyan Jovanovic, Ehud Kalai, Giuseppe Lopomo, George Mailath, Efe Ok, Ariel Rubinstein, Andy Schotter, seminar participants at various universities and conferences, and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Program for Economic Research at Columbia University is also gratefully acknowledged.     

The degree of financial liberalization and aggregated stock-return volatility in emerging markets

In this study, we address whether the degree of financial liberalization affects the aggregated total volatility of stock returns by considering the time-varying nature of financial liberalization. We also explore channels through which the degree of financial liberalization impacts aggregated total volatility. We document a negative relation to the degree of financial liberalization after controlling for size, liquidity, country, and crisis effects, especially for small and medium-sized markets. Moreover, the degree of financial liberalization transmits its negative impact on aggregated total volatility through aggregated idiosyncratic and local volatilities. Overall, our results provide evidence in favor of the view that the broadening of the investor base due to the increasing degree of financial liberalization causes a reduction in the total volatility of stock returns.     

Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining

In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas. In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations — some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.     

Franchise partner selection decision making

This paper aims to investigate international franchise partner selection from the perspective of different decision making models and analyse the influence of organisational factors on the franchise selection decision making. Empirical data were collected from a leading international hotel group through multiple data collection methods. The research findings indicate that the participant organisation mainly exploits a processual approach to decision making. Power over the decision making shifts to different levels where the necessary information can best be accumulated and interpreted in different stages of the process. Different organisational parameters interact and exert influence upon each other while a franchise organisation decides to choose the most appropriate franchise partner.     

Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts

Many strategic interactions in the real world take place among delegates empowered to act on behalf of others. Although there may be a multitude of reasons why delegation arises in reality, one intriguing possibility is that it yields a strategic advantage to the delegating party. In the case where only one party has the option to delegate, we analyse the possibility that strategic delegation arises as an equilibrium outcome under completely unobservable incentive contracts within the class of two-person extensive form games. We show that delegation may arise solely due to strategic reasons in quite general economic environments even under unobservable contracts. Furthermore, under some reasonable restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and actions of the outside party, strategic delegation is shown to be the only equilibrium outcome.     

Regulate one service,tame the entire market: Credit cards in Turkey

In credit card markets banks provide both payment and credit services. Two regulations were recently enacted in the Turkish credit card market: one on payment services in 2005 and the other on credit services in 2006. By employing the well-known  and  method and a unique quarterly data set for 21 Turkish banks between 2002 and 2008, we investigate the extent of banks’ market power in the Turkish credit card market before and after the regulations. Unlike most of the existing literature, which considers competition and regulation for either credit or payment services and ignores the externalities between them, we consider the entire market by taking both services into account. Fixed effects estimations reveal that banks enjoyed collusive oligopoly power before the regulations. Although the first regulation did not have much impact, the second led to rises in both banks’ total revenues and competition in the entire market.