Flexibility at different stages in the life cycle of projects: An empirical illustration of the “freedom to maneuver”

Many textbooks on project management present illustrations concerning the relative size of project attributes during different project phases. The derived models all have attributes in common, such as uncertainty, significance of decisions, and degree of freedom to maneuver, that are typically high in the beginning of the project and low in the end. At the same time, variables such as the accumulated cost and available information begin at low levels and end up at a high level at the end of the project. Based on empirical data from projects, this paper illustrates and quantifies one of these attributes, the freedom to maneuver, in different project phases.     

On the individual moving average inequality

Summary A very simple deduction of a recently treated inequality is presented and some variations on this proof, drawing together various properties, are discussed. Closure of moving average processes undermultiplication is also mentioned.     

Understanding the flow of health policy in the United States: self-interest or ignorance?

Health policy decisions are made in an uneven manner, eluding attempts to explain developments with a coherent theory. Numerous explanations have been suggested to explain individual policy actions, but recently Feldstein has attempted a broader formulation. This Self-Interest Model of Health Policy, however, assumes full knowledge of a policy's benefits and costs. This is an unrealistic assumption, and the model is unable to explain important decisions that have been made in three areas: insurance for long-term care, universal access, and efficiency incentives. This article presents a broader, more powerful formulation of the Feldstein model, specifically incorporating public ignorance as a policy determinant. The vital role of education and health policy research is underscored.     

Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?

In many preferential trade agreements (PTAs), countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non-trade issues such as labour and environmental standards, intellectual property, etc. We provide a model of PTAs motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues and analyse its implications for global free trade and welfare. We find that such PTAs increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade. This occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in PTAs and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them. By explicitly modelling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations, we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model's key prediction. The welfare analysis shows that the current World Trade Organization rules allowing this type of PTAs may be optimal for economically large countries, thus the model can predict the rules we observe. We also analyse alternative rules that constitute a Pareto improvement.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

A brief technology assessment of the Carbon Dioxide effect

Significant increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide are occuring as a result of fossil fuel combustion. More than a four-fold increase over preindustrial levels may occur by the year 2100. Heating of the atmosphere, changes in precipitation patterns and global storm paths, and other resulting effects are sure to cause significant social changes. This article is essentially a methodological case study demonstrating a useful but inexpensive type of technology assessment. It summarizes current research findings on “the CO₂ effect,” and presents hitherto unpublished findings that resulted from a brief but systems-oriented approach. These findings suggest that most published forecasts of phenomena associated with a CO₂ buildup may be systematically low because various positive feedback relationships are not reflected.     

THE JOINT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCESS FOR THE M/M/l QUEUE

We consider the M/M/1-queue and derive an explicit expression for the joint distribution of the number of arrivals and the number of departures in [0, t), given the number of customers initially present. The derivation is almost purely combinatorial, it avoids the use of generating functions, and immediately yields a simple probabilistic interpretation of the result.     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.