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A sample of 9339 subjects aged 13–75, living in the six macro-regions of Poland rated the preferences of 140 various food products, eating frequency and factors influencing food choice. Four groups of consumers were found: “consumers susceptible to advertising and seeking novel healthy products” (33.2% of the sample), “consumers not taking care of their health” (25.4%), “consumers not susceptible to advertising and taking care of their health” (32.5%), and “consumers insensitive to sensory attributes of fruit and vegetables” (9.0%). Among factors influencing the food choice, sensory and functional factors were significant, and health and price – moderate. Advertising was generally denied as an important factor in food choice. The food choice motives were highly dependent on age and gender, and to a lower extent – on region of residence, size of place of residence, economic condition and education level. Women/girls more often showed pro-health behaviours in food choice, choice motives, preferences and food intake.  相似文献   
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In this paper, we analyze the level of media plurality in a market with two private news firms (private duopoly) and in a market with a private news firm and a public news firm (mixed duopoly). In the private duopoly news firms maximize profits. In the mixed duopoly, the private news firm maximizes profits, while the public news firm maximizes social welfare. We show that, in spite of the public news firm maximizing social welfare, neither media plurality nor social welfare needs to be higher under the mixed duopoly compared with the private duopoly. This will depend on the relation between the costs of adapting news to readers' political preferences, the intensity of the readers' political preferences, and the size of the advertising market.  相似文献   
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We conjecture that market bubbles may be the results of the interplay of Goods and Bads (toxic products) which develop through three interlocking moments – herding, swarming and stampeding, with deviations marked by heteroscedasticity. We use our stylized model of financial predation, the Consolidated Model of Financial Predation, and data we have accumulated through in-the-field eight-year research and the study of 30 years of U.S. market history in order to explore the foundations of market crises. We find that blind trust (or the positivity bias) and of the fear to miss out on an opportunity to enter/exit a market impacts the investors’ decisions to invest or retract. We show how markets are driven towards a make-or-break predatory dynamic that creates winners and losers due in part to weak regulations and identify a constant k that permeates market behaviours.  相似文献   
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Dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of RPM. We analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers. We show that RPM indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry‐wide monopoly pricing. The impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties' influence in determining the terms of the contracts. Our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies.  相似文献   
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U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.  相似文献   
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Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than doubles from 1980 to 2006. A measure of the economic importance of this increase is that at the end of the sample period, the average firm can retire all debt obligations with its cash holdings. Cash ratios increase because firms' cash flows become riskier. In addition, firms change: They hold fewer inventories and receivables and are increasingly R&D intensive. While the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in explaining the increase in cash ratios, we find no consistent evidence that agency conflicts contribute to the increase.  相似文献   
19.
Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.  相似文献   
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We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.  相似文献   
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